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This thesis develops a model for understanding and conducting war at the level of 
grand strategy.  Grand strategy seeks the seamless integration of all aspects of national 
power to achieve a desired policy goal.  The model is named the “Instrument-Element 
Model” because it focuses on the essential elements which underlie the instruments of 
power by which belligerents contend with each other.   
Each belligerent is modeled by three elements: the people, the government and 
the military.  Belligerents affect each other using the instruments of national power: 
diplomacy, information, military force, economic leverage, and this thesis argues, ethical 
principles.  This thesis argues that successful grand strategies can focus on the people, the 
government or the military. 
The Instrument-Element Model is tested and illustrated by an analysis of three 
wars in which a successful grand strategy focused on each of the three elements: the 1967 
Arab-Israeli War (focusing on the Military), the 1999 Kosovo War (focusing on the 
Government) and the Algerian Revolution (focusing on the People).  This thesis also 
considers how to apply the Instrument-Model to terrorist and insurgent groups, and 
concludes with three recommendations to help our Republic think, fight and win grand-
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I. MODELS AND THE INSTRUMENT-ELEMENT GRAND-
STRATEGIC MODEL FOR WAR 
This thesis develops a model for understanding and conducting war at the level of 
grand strategy.1  It is named the “Instrument-Element Model” because it focuses on the 
elements which comprise belligerents and the instruments of power they use to affect 
each other.  Most military and political leaders recognize that “war is merely the 
continuation of policy by other means,” and understand the need for a strong connection 
between the use of force and policy goals.2  Less clear may be the role of non-military 
power in war.  At times non-military power has been described as supporting the military 
effort, or it may be omitted from the analysis altogether.  Such characterizations of the 
utility and effects of non-military power are regrettable.  One person who understood the 
importance of full integration between military and non-military power was Sir Basil 
Henry Liddell Hart (1895-1970), a British military officer and theorist.  In his book 
Strategy, Hart refers to the integration of national power to realize policy as grand 
strategy, which he describes as “the [coordination] and [direction of] all the resources of 
a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war- the 
goal defined by fundamental policy.”3  Policy and grand strategy are distinct from each 
other, as grand strategy supports the realization of policy (a group’s desires or goals).  
Grand strategy forms both: the integrated plan to realize policy, and coordinates the 
“policy in execution” as the plan unfolds.4   
If grand strategy is “policy in execution,” why develop a model of how it works in 
war?  There are two reasons. First, analyzing past conflicts using the Instrument-Element 
Model will help determine critical interactions that led to victory or defeat which could 
assist in planning and executing current and future wars.  Second, a useful model could 
help elevate the study of grand strategy for military professionals, the academic 
                                                 
1 Military commanders and policy makers will be referred to collectively as leaders.  They will be 
identified separately when necessary to distinguish between them.  
2 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Peter Paret (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984), 87. 
3 B. H.  Liddell Hart, Strategy 2nd revised edition (London, Meridian, Published by the Penguin Group, 
1991), 322.  
4 Hart, 322.  
2 
community, and policy makers.  In 1967 B. H.  Liddell Hart wrote “the sorry state of 
peace – for both sides, that has followed most wars can be traced to the fact that, unlike 
strategy, the realm of grand strategy is for the most part terra incognita – still awaiting 
exploration, and understanding.”5  This thesis attempts to chart that unknown territory.   
This thesis is organized into five chapters.  Chapter I discusses the need for, and 
then develops a model for war at the level of grand strategy.  Chapters II-IV are case 
studies of wars analyzed using the Instrument-Element Model.  The three wars are: the 
1967 Arab-Israeli War, the 1999 Kosovo War between NATO and the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.) and the 1954-62 Algerian Revolution.  Chapter V contains 
conclusions based on the analysis in Chapters II-IV, avenues for future research and 
recommendations to help our Republic think, fight and win grand-strategically. 
 
A. WHAT DO MODELS DO? 
A model, as a framework, helps refine observations, assimilate new data, shape 
decisions and define actions.6  It helps define a person’s mental vocabulary. A given 
model may be helpful or not depending on the fit between the model and the situation.    
If a person’s vocabulary doesn’t encompass a given situation, responding to it will be 
much more difficult.  By design, all models serve as filters and lenses.  Good models help 
organize chaotic information into understandable structure.  As filters, models can 
summarily reject, what the model considers, unimportant information.  As lenses, models 
alter information.  When beneficial, the lens brings new information into a focus.  When 
harmful a model takes needed information and blurs it.  A good model should recognize 
as many inputs as practical, to limit the chance of being stunned by an unfamiliar input.7  
A depiction of how models effect information is shown in Figure 1.   
                                                 
5 Hart, 322.  
6 Readers will likely be familiar with these four stages as U.S. Air Force Colonel John Boyd’s OODA 
loop, which he defines as: Observation, Orientation, Decision making and Action.  Individuals, or groups, 
are conceived as moving through the OODA loop as they receive and process new information.  See: 
Robert Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver (Novato: Presidio Press, 1991), 51 as well as William S. Lind, 
Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Bolder: Westview Press, 1985), 4-6. 
7 An excess of inputs being observed and considered can slow down an entire model, limiting its 
effectiveness.  The danger of being stunned by an unfamiliar grand-strategic input can be so great however, 




Figure 1.   A Model’s Effects on Observation. 
Models are used consciously or subconsciously, and may be formally defined or informal 
guidelines.  As grand strategy is largely terra incognita, most models about it are 
subconscious and informal.  Leaders are left to develop hunches about how war works 
grand-strategically.  This thesis seeks to develop an explicit model, which will, at a 
minimum, allow unspoken assumptions to be clarified and tested.  
A good grand-strategic model should be symmetric, meaning it would encompass 
all belligerents, by accounting for how they seek to influence, and for how they are 
influenced by, each other.  Many models of warfare, particularly at the operational level, 
only account for how one belligerent affects its adversary.8  Grand-strategically, a non-
symmetric model can leave the user paying greater attention to one’s own plan, and 
losing sight of the enemy’s actions.  A useful grand-strategic model would also be non-
deterministic, meaning it would not emphasize one style of warfare over others.  When 
looking at war grand-strategically, one sees countless ways belligerents have sought to  
 
 
affect each other.  A useful grand-strategic model must encompass as much of this wide 
                                                 
8 The operational level of warfare is the linkage between tactical action and the overall military 
campaign.  As defined in current U.S. military doctrine, there are three levels of war: the strategic, the 
operational and the tactical.  See: Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0, (Washington, D.C., 
The Joint Staff, 10 September 2001), II-2. 
Model as Filter 
 -Information rejected 
Model as Lens 
     -Information Modified 
Situation Observer
4 
variation of form as possible, otherwise users could be stunned by unfamiliar actions, that 
may not even be recognized. 
 
B. AN EXAMPLE OF A USEFUL, NON-SYMMETRIC, DETERMINISTIC 
MODEL 
Looking at a useful, non-symmetric, deterministic model helps understand why, at 
the grand-strategic level, symmetry and non-determinism are so important.  Of current 
military models of warfare, few are more esteemed than Colonel John A. Warden III’s 
“Five Ring Model.”  As one of the lead Air Force planners who developed Operation 
Desert Storm’s air campaign, he used his model to determine and prioritize the types of 
targets to attack.  In his seminal paper, “The Enemy as a System,” Colonel Warden 
described the enemy as a system comprising five elements: leadership, organic essentials, 
infrastructure, population and fielded military forces.9  Warden designed his model to 
apply to a “strategic entity” which he described as a group able to “function on its own 
and is free and able to make decisions as to where it will go and what it will do.”10  He 
envisioned the Five Ring Model as applying to such diverse groups as the human body, a 
nation state, a drug cartel or an electric grid.11  Warden saw the Five Rings as a series of 
concentric circles, with leadership in the center (see Figure 2). 
                                                 
9 Colonel John A. Warden III, U.S. Air Force, “The Enemy as a System,” Airpower Journal 9, 2 
(Spring, 1995), 3.  Available online at: http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/warden.html.  
Accessed 9 SEP 05. 
10 Warden, “The Enemy as a System,” 3.  
11 Warden, “The Enemy as a System,” 3. 
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Figure 2.   Colonel John Warden’s Five Ring Model. 
 
The Five Ring Model describes each successive layer of the enemy system, moving out 
from the center, as possessing a greater numbers of less important targets, except the 
fielded military.  Deployed military forces offer fewer targets than the population and 
they may be able to defend themselves.  The model concludes that the leadership ring is 
the most important because it guides the entire enemy system.  Warden believed that with 
the leadership neutralized, strategic paralysis sets in and the enemy becomes inert.12  
When using the Five Ring model, airpower is the preeminent tool of force.  Early in a 
conflict, it alone can target the leadership ring directly.  A small flight of bombers with 
precision munitions can attack the leadership ring’s few critical targets, either destroying 
the leadership outright or rendering it paralyzed.  Warden’s model exemplifies theoretical 
determinism.  Regardless of the variety of military forces a nation may have, the Five 
Ring Model ensures that airpower is the weapon of choice and that it should be used to 
attack leadership targets, while fielded forces are disregarded or marginalized as targets.  
The Five Ring Model’s nature does not easily lend itself to symmetrical 
application for two or more adversaries in conflict.  As a model, it assumes the user has 
the potential to gain air superiority and striking forces to exploit it.  Since World War 
Two, there have been few wars where both belligerents had sufficient airpower and been 
                                                 







within range of each other.13  In most cases, only one adversary (or neither) has had any 
hope of gaining air superiority and then striking the enemy’s leadership ring.  Within the 
overall domain of war however, Warden’s Five Ring Model plays an important role.  It 
remains a key aid when developing an air campaign for commanders with overwhelming 
airpower.  Leaders must be careful when using a non-symmetric model beyond its 
relevant domain however, as it can lead to overlooking the enemy’s actions. 
 
C. THE INSTRUMENT-ELEMENT MODEL FOR WAR 
The Instrument-Element Model develops in three stages.  First, individual 
belligerents are described.  Second, the way belligerents interact with each other is 
modeled, also included are the effects of the international system (for example: the UN, 
or a separate major nation).  Finally the variability of war’s importance and the passions, 
the degree to which belligerent’s yearn for war, are discussed.  Like Warden’s Five Ring 
Model, the Instrument-Element Model is intended to model “strategic entities,” those 
groups able to “function on [their] own and… free and able to make decisions as to where 
it will go and what it will do.”14  States as “strategic entities” will be used while 
developing the Instrument-Element Model.  Afterwards the applicability of the 
Instrument-Element Model for unconventional belligerents will be discussed.  
1. Describing Belligerents in Terms of Component Elements 
Belligerents are represented by three main elements: the people, the government 
and the military.15  The three elements are important in themselves, as are the connections 
between them, i.e. the way each element affects the other two.  Strong inter-element 
connections can help maintain group cohesion and unity of purpose.  The three elements 
and the three connections together form an organic system, meaning the three elements 
and three connections are all interrelated.  Depending on the belligerent, change in one 
part of the organic system may affect, at times drastically, an interrelated part. 
 
                                                 
13 The 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war is a notable exception, where both adversaries had air forces that 
could, at least theoretically, gain air superiority and exploit it by attacking leadership targets.  
14 Warden, “The Enemy as a System,” 3. 
15 The names of the three elements come from their roles within states; however parallel roles of 
leadership, fighters and supporters exist within insurgent forces and terrorist groups.  
7 




b. The Three Inter-Element Connections 
1. Military - Government (M-G) 
2. Government - People (G-P) 
3. People - Military (P-M) 
The three elements and three inter-element connections form one organic system which 
describes an individual belligerent and is depicted as Figure 3. 
                                  
    








Military – Government 
connection (M-G) 
Government - People 
connection (G-P) 
People - Military 
connection (P-M) 
8 
2. Describing How Belligerents Affect Each Other 
Belligerents affect each other with the four instruments of national power, defined 
in Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1. 





4. Military force.16 
Each instrument of national power can interact with any of the three 
elements and part of determining a successful grand strategy is determining which 
instruments would best influence a given element.  Some instrument-to-element 
interactions (like using military force on unarmed, non-combatant civilians) may be 
illegal or immoral, but are still included in the model because such acts occur in war.  
Being able to map every belligerent’s possible actions is part of creating a symmetric 
model.  
The belligerents’ organic systems and the instruments of national power 
form a symmetric system that allows for a diverse set of interactions.  The international 
system is added, which together forms one superordinate system, the Instrument-Element 
Model.17   The international system receives inputs from, and can affect, each belligerent.  
Including the international system helps leaders consider how their actions will affect 
allies, important non-governmental organizations like the UN or the Red Cross, major 
media agencies and more, as well as the effects these important external entities will have 
on the war.  Figure 4 depicts the Instrument-Element Model, complete with two organic 
systems, the four instruments of national power (notionally directed at each element) and 
the international system.  
                                                 
16 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1, (Washington, D.C., 
The Joint Staff, 14 November 2000), I-6.  This thesis describes the military instrument of national power as 
military force to emphasize the use of combat, in line with the intent of Joint Publication 1.  Military units 
engaged in non-combat missions fall under the diplomatic, economic or informational instruments of 
national power.  
17 Superordinate: meaning “superior in rank, the opposite of subordinate,” The Compact Oxford 




Figure 4.   The Instrument-Element Model. 
Figure 4 depicts two belligerents in conflict, but the Instrument-Element 
Model can be applied to more complex cases.  If allies are operating independently they 
can and should be modeled with their own organic systems.  Allies operating in close 
harmony can be depicted with one organic system if it simplifies analysis.  This thesis 
considers an example of allies operating independently as well as a fairly cohesive 
alliance. 
The Instrument-Element Model is symmetric because it actively includes 
both belligerents, and non-deterministic, because no instrument of national power is 
predominant over the others.  Historian Paul Kennedy put it well when he wrote: “Grand 
Strategy in war is... necessarily more military than it is in peace.”18  A state of war 
implies, and to some degree requires, organized fighting.  Thus during the active period 
of a war, military force will likely play a large role, but the model itself does not require 
                                                 
18 Paul Kennedy et al., Grand Strategies in War and Peace, ed. by Paul Kennedy (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1991), 169. 
Instruments of National Power 
     Diplomatic 
     Information 
     Military Force 
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10 
it.  Theorists have argued eternally as to whether a war can be won without fighting, but 
if it could, it would mean using the three non-military instruments of national power 
against the adversary’s three elements.19  The Instrument-Element Model seeks to 
encompass the widest variety of war’s forms, and could certainly describe a 
predominantly non-military confrontation between adversaries.   
The Instrument-Element Model asks leaders to consider fundamental 
questions like how to best affect the enemy and defend against the enemy’s grand-
strategic attacks.  Considering the enemy’s offensive grand strategy is particularly 
important for larger nations when they war with smaller nations (or groups).  Leaders of 
larger nations may not consider that their enemy is working; not only to resist their 
actions, but also to conduct its own offensive grand strategy, a situation described in one 
of the case studies.  
3. Accounting for the Variability in Wars’ Importance and the Passions 
The Instrument-Element Model also considers how each belligerent values the 
underlying conflict’s importance.  The degree that elements need to be degraded before 
victory/defeat occurs depends on how important the effected adversary views the conflict.  
This thesis defines seven levels of importance: critical, vital, major, significant, moderate, 
minor, and negligible. 
Conflicts of critical importance definitely lead to war and continue house-to-
house until the last person is killed or captured.  Such wars are rare but occur when the 
loser believes his society will be exterminated by the victor.  Conflicts of vital 
importance lead to war and will likely continue until one belligerent cannot continue.  
The military, government, or society will be wrecked.  Conflicts of major importance will 
likely lead to wars of choice.  The decision to go to war may seem fairly clear cut.  The 
war will continue for quite some time, however defeat can occur if the war lasts too long 
or the costs and acceleration of costs rise too quickly.20  Conflicts of significant 
importance may lead to wars of choice, and end more quickly than major wars.  
Significant importance generally represents the lowest level of importance that 
                                                 
19 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1971), 77. 
20 The idea of how the acceleration of costs affects war was brought to my attention by Dr. Scott 
Sigmund Gartner.  Dr. Scott Sigmund Gartner, Lectures: “Strategic Assessment in War” and “How 
Measuring Success in War Leads to Failure.” Naval Postgraduate School, August, 26, 2005. 
11 
belligerents will willingly go to war over.  Issues of moderate importance are normally 
handled with non-military means.  Although coercive diplomacy may be used, the intent 
is to keep differences from escalating into war.  The economic instrument may be the 
lead instrument, with sanctions and embargos used (for example).  Minor issues are 
traditionally handled with diplomacy and information.  Negligible issues require no 
action, and are mentioned for completeness of the levels of importance.   
Level of 
Importance 
Willing  to 
Fight A War? Likely Characterization 
Critical Definitely Absolute War 
Vital Yes Total War 
Major Likely War of Choice –High Order 
Significant Perhaps War of Choice–Low Order 
Moderate Unlikely Coercive Diplomacy 
Minor No Diplomacy 
Negligible No No action 
 
Table 1. The Seven Defined Levels for a Conflict’s Importance. 
The Instrument-Element Model also considers inflammation of the passions, 
wherein the people, the military and/or the government clamor for war.21  Recognizing 
this hunger for war is important because people who are stirred up about a conflict may 
be more likely to support it despite setbacks.  Additionally, when the passions are 
inflamed, a government’s options may be constrained.  Facing high domestic costs (like 
being voted out of office or deposed by a coup), governments may be unwilling submit to 
coercive pressures.22 
The Instrument-Element Model applies to non-state actors.  One of the case 
studies describes the grand strategy of a terrorist-insurgent group.  When the belligerents 
are states, identifying their elements is often easy.  For non-state actors, identifying the 
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elements may prove difficult.  Recognizing differences with formal states, insurgencies 
and terrorist groups must have some mix of leaders, fighters and supporters if they are to 
operate independently.23  For non-state actors, group leaders are akin to the government, 
supporters are the people, and their fighters should be considered the military.  
Recognizing that unconventional belligerents have the three elements means they also 
have three inter-element connections.  Their inter-element connections need 
cohesiveness, just as for states.  Independent non-state actors like insurgency groups and 
terrorist organizations, as “strategic entities,” can therefore be described as organic 
systems and do fit within the Instrument-Element Model.    
D. SUMMARY 
A symmetric and non-deterministic model has been created.  The people, 
government and military, the four instruments of national power and the international 
system have been linked into a superordinate system.  Consideration is given to the 
importance each belligerent places in the war and the degree to which passions are 
inflamed.  Wars of greater importance will likely require complete neutralization of 
an element.  Conflicts of lesser importance can be won/lost with a proportionally 
smaller effect on the elements.  Neutralization of an element is important to 
emphasize, as the outright destruction of an element is not necessary to secure an 
opponent’s defeat.  Governments may chose to abandon war aims before being totally 
destroyed or military forces may stop fighting if they no longer believe in a war’s goals 
or methods.  In Chapters II-IV, the Instrument-Element Model analyzes each of the three 
case studies.  Conclusions, recommendations and avenues for future study are discussed 
in Chapter V. 
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II. FOCUSING ON THE MILITARY: THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR  
Israel’s grand strategy in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War focused almost exclusively 
on destroying the enemy’s deployed military.  Israel sought decisive victory over the 
Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian military forces; to end the military threat.  In doing so, 
Israel was able to greatly improve its geo-strategic situation, through territorial 
enlargement and reduction of its border’s length (both of which were important Israeli 
issues prior to the war).24  In addition, Israel wanted to open the Strait of Tiran, which 
Egypt closed to Israeli shipping May 22nd, 1967. 
This chapter begins with the contours of action.  With a brief outline of the 
conflict established, four aspects of the war will be considered.  They are: an analysis of 
Israel’s grand strategy, the inter-connections between the three elements of each 
belligerent's organic system, the degree to which the passions were inflamed, and the 
conflict’s importance as seen from each belligerent’s point of view.  Limitations of this 
chapter’s analysis will be discussed.  
By late May of 1967, much of Israel, Syria and Egypt had come to believe that 
war was not only likely but imminent.  People openly talked about the upcoming war, 
wondering what form it would take.25  Egypt had asked the UN observers in the Sinai to 
depart, mobilized its Army and eventually positioned over two hundred thousand soldiers 
along the Israeli border.26  On the 22nd of May, Egypt closed the strait of Tiran to Israeli 
shipping, itself an act of war.27  President Nasser’s rhetoric called for the destruction of 
Israel and driving the Jews to the sea declaring “the Arab people want to fight.”28 By late 
May, people throughout Israel were saying “T’Hiyeh milchamah - there will be war.”29 
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A. CONTOURS OF ACTION 
The 1967 War can be understood as having resulted from feelings of Arab 
embarrassment following the 1948 and 1956 Wars.  Seen in this manner, the Arab states 
were looking to ‘cleanse the stain on their honor that was Israel’ once and for all. 
Certainly antagonistic rhetoric, particularly Egyptian, started as early as 1956 with 
Nasser’s “hate Israel” campaign.30  Another argument can be made that neither the Arabs 
nor Israelis truly wanted war in 1967, yet both sides backed into positions they felt they 
could not modify or abandon and war resulted.  
The conflict began April 7, 1967 when Syria shelled Israeli farmers working in 
border settlements.31  Although Syria had sporadically shelled northern Israel since 1956, 
the intensity of artillery shelling increased through March and into April, 1967.  Fed up 
with the increased attacks, on April 7th Israel responded dramatically: first by machine 
gunning the Syrian positions, then bringing in tanks, and eventually the Israeli Air Force 
to destroy Syrian artillery pieces.  Syrian fighters responded and in a series of dogfights 
six Syrian MiGs were shot down.32  After destroying the Syrian fighters, “some of the 
Israeli Mirages then flew on the 50 or so miles to Damascus to demonstrate their 
superiority in Syria’s air space.”33  After the air battle, Israeli Chief of Staff Lieutenant-
General Yitzhak Rabin raised the rhetorical pressure when he issued 
a stern warning to the Syrian Government, indicating that Israel would not 
remain passive in the face of the Syrian attacks and  provocations, and 
that, should activity on the part of the Syrians continue, Israeli reaction 
would be such as to endanger the very existence of the regime in 
Damascus.34 
At the time Syria and Egypt enjoyed close diplomatic relations, and Egypt re-pledged its 
support to Syria against Israeli aggression.   This close support was a legacy of Syria and 
Egypt’s political union that formed the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.) from 1958 to 
1961.  Even after the breakup, Nasser continued to refer to Egypt as the U.A.R. 
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The Soviet Union threw an unexpected wrench into the crisis May 13th, when it 
told Egypt that Israel intended to invade Syria with “11 to 13” brigades on the Syrian 
border.  Israel’s attempt to bring the Russian ambassador to Israel on a fact finding tour 
of Northern Israel would have shown that there were no invasion preparations.  The 
Ambassador declined.  Despite UN Secretary General U Thant’s May 19th statement that 
Israel had not massed an invasion force along Syria’s border, the damage was done.  
Nasser was convinced Israel intended to invade.35   
In May of 1967, President Nasser “was at one of the low points of his career.  For 
five years, his forces had been involved in the civil war in the Yemen without success 
against ill-armed tribesmen.”36  Nasser needed something to turn around his low standing.  
Inflammatory speeches against Israel proved just the answer.  Nasser dramatically 
increased the rhetorical invective during a “Palestine Day” rally of Arab students. The 
May 14th date of the rally was especially symbolic, because on that day in 1948 Israel 
declared its independence, yet Egypt celebrated May 14th as “Palestine Day,” a day when 
Nasser expressed solidarity with the Palestinian people and denounced the existence of 
Israel.  Throughout the Arab world, people celebrated Nasser’s speech with what 
bordered on hysteria.  Arab state after Arab state pledged support for the forthcoming war 
against Israel, including Iraq which quickly dispatched a division of soldiers to Jordan.37 
Action followed rhetoric when on May 15th, Nasser deployed large contingents of 
Egyptian ground forces into the Sinai.  Egyptians cheered as their army moved forward to 
confront the Zionist enemy.  Nasser employed defensive-offensive rhetoric.  He said 
Israel would strike first, Egypt would absorb the blow, and then the Arabs would wipe 
Israel from the face of the Earth.  On May 16th, Nasser asked the commander of the UN 
peace keeping forces in the Sinai to depart in light of the likely war, saying:  
I have instructed the armed forces of the United Arab Republic to be 
prepared for action against Israel the moment the latter carries out an act 
of aggression against any Arab state.  In light of these orders our forces 
have been concentrated in Sinai on our eastern frontiers.  To ensure the 
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complete safety of UN forces in observation points along our borders, we 
request that these forces be removed at once.38  
To much of the world’s surprise, the UN observers departed immediately.  U Thant 
concluded that the observers had no legal standing without Egyptian approval, and Israel 
rejected an offer to place the observers in Israel.  Egyptian and Israeli forces were now 
face to face for the first time since 1956.  With Egyptian forces continuing to deploy into 
the Sinai and without the UN observers providing notional protection, Israel began 
calling up military reserves.   
On May 22nd, Egypt went too far.  Nasser declared the Strait of Tiran closed to 
Israeli shipping.  Tiran controlled access to Israel’s vital Red Sea port of Elat, the closure 
of which Israel had long identified as cause for war.  Egypt’s act clearly met one of 
Israel’s previously declared causes for war, and with a tremendous mobilized reserve, 
Israeli leaders soon felt there was no recourse but war.  The only questions were: how 
would the war begin, who would participate and how would it end.  The Israeli military 
advocated a preemptive strike to eliminate Egypt’s air force.  Israel hoped the war could 
be limited to Egypt and Syria, and that Jordan could be convinced to not participate.  
Battle objectives were to destroy the threatening military forces and seize territory to 
improve Israel’s position.   
Israel executed a preemptive strike June 5th when the Israeli air force destroyed 
almost the entire Egyptian air force on the ground.  Eleven Egyptian airfields were caught 
unprepared “minutes after the end of the Egyptian dawn alert.”39  Israeli fighters bombed 
the runways, strafing and rocketing aircraft on the ground.  Only eight Egyptian fighters 
got airborne, and all were destroyed in air to air combat.40 With one preemptive strike, 
Israel ensured its air superiority over the Egyptian front and gained an enormous 
advantage over their most deadly foe.  By “10:35[am], June 5, 1967, the bulk of the 
Israeli Air Force was free to destroy the Jordanian, Syrian and Iraqi air forces and to 
engage directly in the destruction of Egyptian armored formations in the Gaza Strip and 
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across Sinai.”41  Despite Israeli entreaties to Jordan’s King Hussein to sit the war out, he 
could not.  He faced tremendous internal pressure to join Egypt, Syria and Iraq in 
destroying Israel for the everlasting Arab glory.  When Israeli jets attacked Egypt, the 
Jordanian army attacked Israel, primarily with artillery.  After Jordan attacked, Israel 
“swiftly [exploited] the opportunity that had arisen to conquer the old city of Jerusalem 
and the West Bank.”42  Capturing the old city, and the Wailing Wall in particular, was 
more than enough for many Israelis to declare total victory.  For them “the Wailing Wall 
had symbolized Jewish national hopes for 1,897 years, and the Israelis’ attitude was 
summed up by [Brigade Commander, Colonel Mordechai] Gur when he stood before its 
great boulders: ‘None of us alive has ever seen or done anything so great as he has done 
today.’”43 
Despite facing enemies on three sides, Israel did not fight one coherent enemy.  In 
fact Israel fought three separate wars, one each against Egypt, Jordan and Syria, largely 
in that order.  Operating from an interior position, Israel dealt punishing blows to 
Egyptian and Jordanian ground forces.  As Egypt and Syria’s militaries were not well 
synchronized, Syria stood by while Israel pummeled Egypt, re-conquering the Sinai.  
Although Jordanian forces fought fiercely, inflicting approximately one half of Israel’s 
total casualties, Israel’s assault drove the Jordanian army from the West Bank.44 
Israel’s main thrust reached the east bank of the Suez Canal June 8th.  With 
Egypt’s military knocked out of the war, Israel undertook a rapid redeployment to focus 
on Syria.  Israel focused on capturing the Golan Heights, from which Syria had shelled 
Israel over the previous twenty years.45  In response to Israel’s surprise air attack against 
Egypt “the farmland below the Golan Heights... suffered from Syrian artillery shelling 
and raids, but no major Syrian attack [was] launched.”46  Israel’s assault against Syria 
began June 9th, and by the 10th, Israel secured the Golan Heights.  Due to differences 
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between the Arab’s political leadership and a lack of military integration and preparation, 
“Egypt, Syria, and Jordan fought three separate wars and lacked the ability to use 
reinforcements from the other Arab states effectively.”47 
In less than six days, Israel achieved all of its military objectives and was 
prepared to accept a cease fire, which the UN was aggressively pushing on the 
belligerents.  The military might of Egypt, Syria and Jordan was smashed, leaving them 
(at least temporarily) unable to threaten Israel.  Israel’s geo-strategic position improved 
greatly: “Israeli-controlled territory more than doubled thanks to its conquest of the West 
Bank, the Sinai and the Golan Heights, while the total length of its [ground] borders were 
reduced.”48  Arab artillery pieces no longer held major Israeli population centers within 
range and it became much harder for the Jordanian army to cut Israel into two parts.49  
Capturing the Sinai opened the Straight of Tiran to Israeli shipping, and provided 
tremendous strategic depth against Egypt.  At the time, many considered the 1967 War a 
complete Israeli success. 
 
B. ANALYSIS OF GRAND STRATEGY 
The primary target of Israel’s grand strategy was the Egyptian and Syrian 
militaries and the seizure of the Sinai and Golan Heights territories.  Prior to the war’s 
start, Israel petitioned Jordan to not enter the war, should it occur.50  In pre-war planning 
Israeli commanders expressed great concern that Jordan might cut Israel into two parts, 
inhibiting the flow of Israeli military forces between the Sinai and the Golan Heights, 
considered a key to success.  When Jordan refused to sit the war out, and in light of 
thespectacular success of the June 5th air raids, some Israeli leaders saw Jordan’s entrance 
into the war as a gift allowing Israel to capture the West Bank, a territory many 
considered part of historical Israel.51 
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Israel specifically did not target Egyptian or Jordanian people using any of the 
instruments of national power.  Israel certainly had the capability to use the diplomatic 
and informational instruments on their people.  The economic instrument would not have 
been as effective, as Israel’s economy did not integrate with her Arab neighbors, a 
necessity for trade sanctions.  Especially after the tremendous success of the June 5th air 
attacks, Israel could have conducted air combat sorties against Egyptian, Syrian or 
Jordanian cities.52  Israel chose to dedicate its air force to close air support for the Army 
and not attack enemy cities.  Why?  There are three answers.  First, Israel lacked the 
airplanes, training and procedures for effective strategic bombing.  Second, strategic 
bombing could not have brought military success faster than their mechanized army.  
Third, strategic bombings could prove counterproductive grand-strategically.  Israel 
already faced international censure for her preemptive attack.  Killing civilians in cities 
with airpower could have eroded what little international support and legitimacy Israel 
enjoyed.  
Israel targeted Jordan’s government with diplomacy, in an effort to keep her out 
of the war.  Israel also targeted Syria’s people and government with the information 
instrument when Rabin declared that Israel would not tolerate Syria’s attacks and could 
respond in a manner threatening “the very existence of the regime in Damascus.”53  
Although the Israeli government may not have sanctioned Rabin’s statement, it certainly 
inflamed both Syria and Egypt.  Once the war began, Israel ceased vigorous use of the 
diplomatic, economic and informational instruments of power.  Grand strategies to attack 
an enemy’s government usually do so to isolate the government from the military (in an 
effort to degrade the military’s ability to function cohesively), or change the 
government’s mind as part of coercive diplomacy.  In the 1967 War, Israel did not need 
to attack the governments of Egypt, Syria or Jordan to gain an edge against the fielded 
military forces.  Israel was able to destroy her enemy’s armies, capture the desired land 
and present the situation as a fait accompli to the Arab states, by focusing on the military 
alone. 
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Figure 5.   A Depiction of the Belligerents’ Grand Strategies. 
 
C. INTER-CONNECTIONS OF THE THREE ELEMENTS 
Israel’s military-government (M-G) connection played a significant role in the 
war as Israel’s military was a successful meritocracy.  Officers and enlisted were 
promoted based on competency, which allowed the military to conduct realistic war 
planning.  Additionally, military leaders reported the results of war planning and 
intelligence estimates to civilian authorities without fear of reprisal.  Realistic planning 
and frank communications between the military and national command authority resulted 
in a tremendous advantage in battle.   
Egypt and Syria’s M-G connections played critical roles in the 1967 War.  Unlike 
Israel, the Egyptian and Syrian militaries were not meritocracies.  There was an absence 
of realistic war planning and their governments had legitimate concerns about their 
control over the military.  President Nasser and Syria’s President Nur ad-Din Atasi had 
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each come to power through a military coup.54  As a result, both Nasser and Atasi 
ensured the military was loyal to them personally in order to ensure their political 
survival.  Personal loyalty ties undermine meritocracy, and they did so in the Egyptian 
and Syrian militaries, to the detriment of planning, readiness and operational 
performance.  Jordan’s M-G connection played a significant role.  Without a history of 
military coups, Jordan developed a superior military which inflicted a disproportionate 
share of Israel’s casualties. 
The Israeli government-people (G-P) connection had a significant affect on the 
war’s course.  As a democracy, Israeli’s elected leaders who displayed competence, and 
when they failed to do so they were removed from office.  As a whole, Israelis felt a 
direct ownership for the security of their state and with 264,000 people in the active or 
reserve military, out of a population of 2 million, everyone was either in the military or 
knew someone who was.   
In the Arab states, and particularly Egypt, the G-P connection highlighted the 
dynamic by which leaders incited their people with promises to destroy Israel, and then 
got trapped by their own rhetoric.  Once the Arab societies yearned for war, it was 
virtually impossible to avoid it.  The non-democratic nature of the Arab states also had a 
debilitating effect on governmental competence, which affected military performance.  
Israel’s people-military (P-M) connection played a critical role and was 
epitomized by the role of reservists.  At the time of the 1967 War, Israel’s armed force 
“comprised 2000 regulars and up to 72,000 conscripts and reservists undergoing 
training.”55  This core force was designed to be augmented with reservists, so that when 
fully augmented, Israel could have a 264,000 person military within 72 hours.56  As the 
1967 crisis escalated, Israel activated greater and greater numbers of reservists, placing 
tremendous pressure on civil society.  The economy ground to a halt as Israel waited for 
war.  Israel’s government knew the Arabs maintained a much larger standing military,  
 
                                                 
54 Sydney D. Bailey, Four Arab-Israeli Wars and the Peace Process (London, Macmillan Press LTD, 
1990), 248. 
55 Barker, 49. 
56 Barker, 48. 
22 
able to sustain offensive positions longer than Israel could rely on its activated reserves.  
Unable to wait, the stalled economy directly contributed to Israel launching its 
preemptive strike.   
Within the Arab states, the P-M connection played only a minor role.  Certainly 
the military keenly felt peoples’ yearning for the destruction of Israel.  This could have 
pressured military leaders to inflate readiness reports prior to battle.   
 
Figure 6.   A Summary of the Inter-Element Connections. 
 
D. ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT’S LEVEL OF IMPORTANCE AND 
PASSION 
As war approached, passions reached such heights in Israel, Syria and Egypt that 
people on both sides clamored to start the war.  Egypt had a long-running “hate Israel” 
campaign that began immediately after the 1956 war; “pamphlets, films, television, radio 
and even school books were used to foment the ‘ideological’ campaign against Israel.”57  
On top of the long standing “hate Israel” campaign, President Nasser stepped up the anti-
Israel rhetoric at his May 14, 1967 Palestine Day rally of Arab students.  At the rally 
President Nasser’s theme was: 
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that the ‘Arab evolution’ was faced with a coordinated conspiracy in 
which the US and British ‘imperialism’ was acting together with both 
Israel and ‘Arab reaction.’ (‘Arab reaction’ referred to King Hussein of 
Jordan, who was at loggerheads with Syria over the activities of the Fatah 
terrorists, and who refused to allow Egyptian troops to be stationed in his 
country.)58 
The Arab street reacted with tremendous approval.  Although Nasser’s popularity had 
been at a deep low following five years of prolonged fighting in Yemen, he was again “at 
the peak of popularity, as one Arab government after the other volunteered support and 
was caught up in the enthusiasm of the impending war.”59  Throughout the Arab world, 
people spoke openly about the impending destruction of the state of Israel.  The Arab 
world thought it was ready for the final showdown with Israel.  Nasser’s state controlled 
radio station Saut-al Arab (Voice of the Arabs) proclaimed “all Egypt is now prepared to 
plunge into total war which will put an end to Israel.”60  Nasser himself said “our basic 
objective will be the destruction of Israel.  The Arab people want to fight.”61   
Within Israeli society, most did not yearn for battle, but were resigned and 
committed to it.  They believed that if war was inevitable, it should begin and be best 
conducted to Israel’s advantage.  Some within Israel, however, wanted to fight: “a father 
told of his 10 year old son returning from school saying that if the Israeli Government 
would not fight he did not wish to be an Israeli any more- he would go to America and be 
an American.”62  Of course the opinions of one 10 year old boy cannot be said to alter the 
actions of a government, yet the anecdote reveals how far combative feelings had spread 
within Israel. 
Looking at the 1967 War through the lens of importance proves interesting.  
Simply put, the war was of critical importance to Israel (which feared being wiped out of 
existence), and not critically important to Egypt, Syria or Jordan, regardless of their 
rhetoric.  Considering the seven levels of importance, the 1967 War was a war of choice 
for the Arabs, with significant importance.  Outside of Nasser’s fiery rhetoric (and 
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subsequently inflamed populous) nothing pushed the Arabs to war.  Egypt could have 
responded to the (false) reports of Israel’s upcoming invasion of Syria without provoking 
war.   The Arabs fought for pride, because of their embarrassment in the 1948 and 1956 
Wars, and to win a homeland for another people, the Palestinians.  The Israeli perspective 
was completely different.  Fears of Israel’s destruction led to “one Israeli doctor [being] 
approached by a middle age woman who wanted suicide pills to take if necessary - she 
had lived through one of Hitler’s concentration camps and felt that she could not live 
through anything similar.”63  Israelis feared eradication and their commitment to the 
upcoming war was infused throughout Israeli society.   
In six days, Israel’s masterful strategic and operational execution removed the 
Arab states’ ability to fight a modern war.  This was the turning point, where Israel’s 
actions clarified the war’s importance for the Arabs.  Prior to the war Arab leaders called 
for “total war” and expressed a willingness to bear any burden to destroy Israel.  Faced 
with the destruction of their modern military forces, they could have sent further masses 
of infantry into battle to fight a non-modern bloody campaign.  Instead Arab leaders 
decided they had been defeated, and accepted the loss of non-critical territory.  The Arab 
response to Israeli success is akin to being punched in the nose.  At times, as blood pours 
down the nose, one reevaluates a conflict and determines it’s not worth fighting for after 
all.  Getting a little bloody can have a very clarifying effect on priorities.64 
 
E.  COUNTER ARGUMENTS AND LIMITATIONS 
In reviewing the 1967 War and this chapter’s analytical framework, it is 
impossible to see Israel’s grand strategy as anything other than focusing on the Arab 
states’ military element, using the military force instrument.  As discussed in the Analysis 
of Grand Strategy, Israel never bombed Arab population centers, did not raise sanctions 
or conduct an economic blockade.  An information campaign to change the minds of the 
Arab people or government was never attempted, no doubt because it was considered 
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pointless.  That said, what are the limitations?  The Instrument-Element Model and 
details presented do not explain how constrained Nasser felt by the Arab people’s 
hysteria.  While it is certainly reasonable to suppose that Nasser built up a wave of 
emotions that subsequently swept him and Egypt away, references from contemporary 
Egyptian sources would add weight to that supposition.  Additionally, the role of the 
international system remains indistinct.  The United States was not yet Israel’s chief 
patron in 1967, and its leadership was taken by surprise when the war broke out, having 
assumed that Israel’s evident military superiority would suffice to deter surrounding Arab 
states.  The Soviet Union’s role is especially murky, and its motives for passing what it 
knew to be false intelligence about Israeli plans against Syria are a mystery to this day. 
 
F.  FINAL THOUGHTS  
One amazing aspect of the 1967 War was that despite Israel’s operational military 
brilliance, the war proved inconclusive grand-strategically.65  Israel’s success, while 
spectacular did not destroy Egypt, Syria, or Jordan.  Seized lands were not vital to the 
continuity of the Arab states and  
none of the Arab states who lost territory in the Six Day War was prepared 
to make peace in exchange for its return.  Egypt felt humiliated by this 
new demonstration of Israeli military superiority, and waged a campaign 
of bombardment and raids across the Suez Canal that became known as 
the War of Attrition.66 
And so the Arab states accepted the UN ceasefire and prepared for another round of 
battle.  One should remember Nasser’s pre-war rhetoric when considering that Egypt, 
Syria and Jordan accepted their losses.  The Arabs had a base of eighty million people to 
raise a levée en mass and continue the fight against Israel, but did not.67  Egypt said it was 
ready to fight a ‘total war’ to destroy the state of Israel and bear any burden to do so, as 
long as the burden was very light and the challenges not significant.   
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Historians disagree about Nasser’s motives in the run up to the 1967 War.  One 
well researched interpretation is Chaim Herzog’s which propounds that Nasser wanted 
war in 1967.  Herzog laid out three assumptions of how Nasser thought the war would 
unfold.  Herzog derived these assumptions from a close analysis of “the articles of 
Mohammed Hassanein Heikal, Editor of Al Ahram, who was Nasser’s closest confidant at 
that time.”68  Herzog presents Nasser’s three assumptions as: 
1. That, after the United Nations forces would be withdrawn at his 
request, he would close the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. 
2. That, following this action, the Israelis would be likely to try to 
open the Straits by force and break the blockade.  This would lead to war. 
3. That, in the event of an outbreak of war, the ratio of forces and the 
state of preparedness of his forces guaranteed Egyptian military success.  
Nasser was convinced that, in a combination of both the military and 
political struggle that would ensue, he would gain the upper hand.69 
 
Whether the Arabs were incompetently conducting an “extraordinarily naïve 
exercise in coercive diplomacy,” or expecting to actually fight, they never undertook the 
planning and training needed to make the destruction of Israel a reality.70  The Egyptian 
Army’s 1967 War Operation plan “Kahir” was not designed to invade Israel, but instead 
to conduct a mobile defense of the Sinai.71  As the 1967 War grew close, Nasser ordered 
the Army to conduct Operation Kahir, sending the Egyptian army into the Sinai, but  
prior to May 1967, no concrete steps were ever taken to implement 
Operation Kahir beyond committing the details to paper.  The plan was 
never actually promulgated to division commanders, and no war games 
were ever conducted.  Indeed, no map-table exercise was ever held.72 
As a mobile defense of the Sinai, Kahir was never enough to destroy Israel.  The Arab 
states lacked a plan for how to invade Israel and how to manage the two million Jewish 
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refugees that success would have created; yet military commanders assured their leaders 
that they were ready to fight and win.   
Egypt and the Arabs presented Israel with a challenge when Egypt closed the 
Strait of Tiran, and massed so powerful a force on Israel’s borders as to threaten its 
existence. 73  Israel responded by destroying the Arab’s deployed military, seizing the 
Sinai, West Bank and Golan Heights.  With their passions cooled, the Arabs were 
unwilling to fight a total war for the destruction of Israel.  Instead they accepted the UN 
ceasefire.  The Arabs may have been conducting a policy of coercive diplomacy.  They 
may have actually intended war.  Either way, Israel’s response, driven by a combination 
of intense public passion and cold-blooded military calculation, appears in retrospect to 
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III. FOCUSING ON THE GOVERNMENT: THE 1999 KOSOVO WAR 
NATO’s grand strategy in the 1999 Kosovo War focused almost entirely on 
changing the behavior of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s (F.R.Y.’s) government.74  
The F.R.Y. was engaged in a bitter internal war that pitted the Serbians (ethnic Slavs) 
against the Kosovo Albanians (ethnic Albanians) who lived primarily in Kosovo, a 
province of Serbia.  A Serbian nationalist, Slobodan Milosevic, had been elected 
President of the F.R.Y. by championing Serbian strength over the Kosovo Albanians, and 
his government actively repressed the Kosovo Albanians.  Some Kosovo Albanians 
responded by forming the Kosovo Liberation Army (K.L.A.) which fought a terrorist 
insurgency to seize control of Kosovo from Serbia.  F.R.Y./Serb forces, whose ranks had 
been purged of ethnic Albanians by Milosevic’s government, responded savagely with 
atrocities intended to break the K.L.A.’s popular support and convince Kosovo Albanians 
to leave Serbia. Many Kosovo Albanians did leave, which created an international 
refugee problem. 
Western leaders were appalled that ethnic cleansing was occurring in Europe and 
vowed to do something.  Russia and China threatened to veto any UN resolution that 
interfered in Yugoslavia’s internal matters and the crisis escalated.  NATO, led by British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair and U.S. President Bill Clinton decided to get involved and 
stop the F.R.Y.’s violent campaign.  F.R.Y. forces and Milosevic ignored NATO’s 
warnings and continued to repress the Kosovo Albanians.    
That NATO represented nineteen separate countries played a central role in the 
formulation of grand strategy and the conduct of the war.  Maintaining alliance cohesion 
and degrading the enemy’s alliance or sources of international support were critical parts 
of both belligerents’ grand strategies.  NATO’s war had two phases.  In the first phase, 
NATO sought, unsuccessfully, to coerce the F.R.Y. with military air strikes that were 
noteffectively coordinated with a coherent grand strategy.  In the second phase, NATO 
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developed an integrated grand strategy and seamlessly integrated all instruments of 
national power to isolate, deny, punish and ultimately compel the F.R.Y. to surrender. 
This chapter begins with the contours of action.  With a brief outline of the 
conflict established, four aspects of the war will be considered.  They are: an analysis of 
NATO’s grand strategy, the inter-connection between the three elements of each 
belligerent's organic system, the degree to which the passions were inflamed and how 
important each belligerent considered the conflict.  The limitations of this analytic 
approach will also be discussed. 
 
A. CONTOURS OF ACTION 
The direct roots of NATO’s Kosovo campaign lay in the unraveling of communist 
Yugoslavia, following the death of its founder, Josip Broz Tito, in 1980, and its gradual 
replacement by an unstable multi-ethnic federation dominated by its largest component 
state, Serbia.  Historically, Serbia’s ethnic tensions and violence had roots several 
hundred years old.  Aggravating these tensions, Kosovo Polje, a battle site of tremendous 
emotional value to the Serbs, lay within Kosovo.  At that site in 1389, Serbia’s Prince 
Lazar died while resisting the Ottoman Turks expansion.75  Serbs considered the site the 
“heartland of their nation.”76  
In 1989 a wave of Serb resentment against Kosovo Albanians propelled Slobodan 
Milosevic, a Serbian nationalist, to the Presidency of Yugoslavia.  Milosevic downgraded 
Kosovo’s autonomy, purged ethnic Albanians from leadership positions and suppressed 
Albanian culture.77  Kosovo Albanian resistance inspired fierce official reprisals, a cycle 
of violence that alarmed Western leaders, who twice warned the two belligerents to cease 
hostilities (June and September, 1998).78  Within the UN, Russia and China said they 
would veto resolutions that interfered with Yugoslavia’s internal matters.  Without UN 
support, Western leaders turned to NATO to unify their voices and hopefully project 
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legitimacy.  In early 1999, NATO’s threats brought F.R.Y. and K.L.A. leaders to 
Rambouillet, France where NATO outlined their solution to the crisis.  Despite NATO’s 
significant pressure, the talks broke down. 
War followed on March 24th, 1999, almost literally as an extension and 
amplification of the stalled negotiations.  Two long range bombers dropped precision 
bombs; aircraft and ships fired cruise missiles, the first of which exploded at 8:01 pm 
Kosovo time.79  The attack concentrated on F.R.Y. air defenses to aid subsequent 
strikes.80  NATO wanted to send Milosevic the signal that it was serious about stopping 
the suppression of Kosovo Albanians.  Planners and leaders believed that briefly 
bombing Yugoslavia would force Milosevic to the bargaining table and so a “limited 2-
day strike” was the basis for planning NATO’s air campaign.81  Only “112 US and 102 
allied aircraft [were] committed to the campaign, [and] only a relatively small number 
were shooters capable of delivering precision weapons effectively.”82  NATO leaders had 
publicly disqualified discussion of a ground invasion.  The day the war began President 
Clinton said bluntly “I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war.”83  From 
the start, NATO’s air campaign consisted of three phases of increasing destructiveness, 
but leaders believed that only a few days of phase I bombing would be necessary to force 
the F.R.Y. back to the negotiating table.84  The three phases were: 
Phase I: establish air superiority over Serbia and supremacy over 
Kosovo…  
Phase II: attack military targets inside Kosovo, as well as Serbian 
reinforcements in Yugoslavia south of the 44th parallel. 
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Phase III: expand air operations to cover a wide range of military targets 
throughout the whole territory of Yugoslavia.”85 
Yugoslavia did not capitulate as expected, however, and between March 26th and 
the 30th, the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s decision-making body, decided “to escalate 
the air campaign to phase II [begun March 27th] and then II plus [March 30th].”86  With 
NATO’s new policy direction, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana directed 
“SACEUR [General Wesley Clark] to initiate a broader range of air operations in the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, intensifying action against Yugoslav forces.”87  As a 
result, NATO bombed the Yugoslavian interior ministry April 3rd, the first attack within 
central Belgrade.88   
The psychological effect of NATO’s escalatory, coercive strategy was not 
initially as expected.  The bombing campaign “lifted a constraint on [Milosevic] that may 
have been operative until that point.  Before the bombs began to fall, he had an incentive 
to keep NATO from attacking him.  Once the attack was underway, however, he no 
longer had that same reason to hold back.”89  And so Serbian forces executed “Operation 
Horseshoe,” their previously established plan to purge Kosovo Albanians from Kosovo 
through terror and direct attack, including “emptying the key cities of Prizren, Pec and 
Pristina of their largely [Kosovo] Albanian populations.”90  Despite NATO’s best efforts, 
F.R.Y. forces were succeeding in their ethnic cleansing strategy.  Responding to the 
humanitarian crisis, NATO increased its emphasis on attacking fielded F.R.Y. forces, 
including tanks, artillery pieces and troop formations.  Unfortunately, NATO’s airpower 
was not well suited to stop Serbian atrocities.91 
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From April 23rd through the 25th, the NATO states held a summit of their Heads 
of State and Government.  Leaders discussed the Kosovo War’s progress and grand 
strategy.  The war had dramatically escalated beyond the modest two day strike 
envisioned before the war began.  By April 23rd,   
NATO had 690 aircraft in the vicinity of operations around Yugoslavia, as 
well as twenty ships in the vicinity, roughly twice as many of each as at 
the War’s beginning.92 
As a result of discussions, the North Atlantic Council directed warships to cut off the 
F.R.Y.’s flow of oil.93   
NATO leaders led by Prime Minister Tony Blair began limited discussions about 
invading Kosovo to expel F.R.Y. forces.  Prime Minister Blair signaled this shift during a 
televised interview with PBS’s Jim Lehrer when he said: “we should plan and assess all 
options” which, in context, meant ground troops in Kosovo. 94 
On the last day of the Washington Summit, Russian President Yeltsin called 
President Clinton.  Yeltsin had determined Russia’s interest required that he work with 
NATO to solve the Kosovo crisis, rather than not lose credibility and the good will of the 
West by supporting Russia’s traditional client, Serbia.  That April 25th phone call 
“marked a definite turning point in US-Russian relations” and indeed the whole Kosovo 
War.95  Before Russia’s shift, Milosevic could at least hope for direct Russian material 
support and diplomatic aid in the UN.  Afterwards he knew the F.R.Y. stood alone.96 
Recognizing Russia’s new role, “NATO [invited former Russian Prime Minister] 
Chernomyrdin to talks on Kosovo” designed to get the F.R.Y. to capitulate.97  The same 
day during a televised interview there was a dramatic display of Yugoslav dissention 
when “F.R.Y. Deputy PM Vuk Draskovic... [called] on Serb leaders to tell the public ‘the 
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truth’ about NATO's resolve, world opinion toward the Serbs, and that Russia [would] 
not provide military aid to the F.R.Y. Draskovic [advised] the Serb population to support 
the introduction of a UN peacekeeping force in Kosovo.”98  Milosevic subsequently fired 
Draskovic, but not before the Serbian people had heard a credible dissenting view of the 
war.  
 In the meantime, collateral damage from the bombing campaign was beginning 
to have serious political consequences. On April 23rd, NATO bombed Belgrade’s state-
run television station, Radio Television of Serbia (RTS), with precision weapons, 
knocking it off the air for 6 hours and killing 10 civilians.99  Many were outraged at this 
controversial attack, including “the European Broadcasting Union, made up of 68 
broadcasters in 49 countries” which noted that the Belgrade RTS “center had been used 
to transmit reports by international as well as local media.”100  NATO officials defended 
the attack by claiming that the facility transmitted Serbian propaganda, which was true 
enough, though largely unrelated to the immediately pressing problem of what to do to 
stop the expulsion of the Kosovo Albanians.   
Far worse was the attack on the Chinese Embassy.  On May 7th it was destroyed 
by five 2000 pound precision bombs dropped from a B-2 bomber.  Twenty people were 
wounded, and three died.101  A U.S. review of the incident determined that although the 
five bombs struck their designated targets, the CIA produced those aim points with a 
flawed planning process.102  Certainly the attack “[poisoned] U.S. and Chinese relations... 
and helped to push the Chinese towards siding with Serbia in the UN.”103 
Eight weeks into NATO’s war “both [General] Clark and NATO’s political 
leaders were desperate for results.  A string of dreadful accidents- hitting the train on the 
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bridge, bombing the refugee convoy and a string a Serbian old people’s home- were all 
draining away public support for the air war.  Opinion polls were shifting alarmingly.”104   
President Clinton recognized his declaration eliminating the use of ground troops, 
while probably politically helpful on March 24th, could be fueling the F.R.Y.’s resistance.  
As ground forces could be needed and to undermine Milosevic’s resolve, on May 18th, 
“President Clinton very publicly announced... that ‘all options [meaning ground forces] 
are on the table,’ openly [ending] the flat rejection of the ground option he had made on 
March 24.”105  Additionally NATO leaders authorized attacking phase III civil 
infrastructure targets which had previously been off limits.106  Such targets included 
bridges that NATO termed “dual use,” meaning that they could be used by civilians or 
military forces. 
On May 23rd, NATO bombed the electrical grids of major Serbian cities, saying 
they fed air defense and command and control sites, although it also “meant taking out 
the power to hospitals, babies’ incubators, [and] water-pumping stations.”107  The attack 
“sent a powerful message to [Serbia’s] civilian population, who until then had been 
largely unaffected by NATO’s air war.108 
On May 27th Milosevic “was told about NATO’s likely invasion plans by Victor 
Chernomyrdin during the latter’s first visit to Belgrade.”109  With Russia’s shift, and in 
light of the potential invasion, Milosevic began to signal a willingness to comply with 
NATO’s demands.  On June 3rd, “The FRY [accepted] terms brought to Belgrade by EU 
envoy Ahtisaari and Russian envoy Chernomyrdin” which smoothed the way for 
F.R.Y./NATO direct talks.110  NATO and F.R.Y. officers met to settle the terms of  
hostilities and in the evening of June 9th, they signed a Military Technical Agreement 
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which declared that Yugoslavia would comply with NATO demands and NATO would 
end its air attacks.111  NATO’s war lasted 78 days. 
 
B. ANALYSIS OF GRAND STRATEGY 
NATO’s grand strategy primarily targeted the F.R.Y. government.  Because 
NATO saw the F.R.Y. as a dictatorial state, Milosevic was the focus of effort.  As 
described in the Department of Defense after action report to Congress, NATO had three 
main interests in the Kosovo crisis: 
First, Serb aggression in Kosovo directly threatened peace throughout the 
Balkans and the stability of southeastern Europe...  
Second, Belgrade’s repression in Kosovo created a humanitarian crisis of 
staggering proportions... 
Third, Milosevic’s conduct leading up to Operation Allied Force directly 
challenged the credibility of NATO, an alliance that has formed the 
bedrock of transatlantic security for 50 years.112 
With these three interests, NATO attempted to persuade Milosevic diplomatically to stop 
repressing the Kosovo Albanians.  Simultaneously, NATO told the K.L.A. to cease their 
offensive and let a peace process develop.  Initially NATO leaders worked within the UN 
framework but found Russia and China limited their efforts.  Russia and China were 
concerned with setting an international precedent whereby the UN could interfere in a 
state’s sovereign matters with force, peace keepers or an occupying contingent.  Russia 
additionally had historic links to Serbia.  Seeing Russia and China threaten to veto 
proposals in the UN undoubtedly gave Milosevic confidence that he could successfully 
resist NATO’s aggression. 
With the UN option blocked and the failed Rambouillet talks, NATO began its air 
war on Serbia.  The stated goals for the air war were: 
• A verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of 
violence and repression; 
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• The withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and 
paramilitary forces; 
• The stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence 
•  The unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced 
persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid 
organizations; 
• The establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo 
on the basis of the Rambouillet accords, in conformity with 
international law and the Charter of the United Nations.113 
NATO first focused on punishing the F.R.Y.’s government with airpower.  NATO’s 
initial air strikes failed to coerce Milosevic.  His connection with Russia was still strong, 
damage minimal, and NATO had clearly ruled out an invasion.  The F.R.Y. used 
NATO’s bombing to advantage and accelerated its ethnic cleansing campaign as General 
Clark admitted:  
At the end of April... after six weeks of bombing, there were more Serb 
forces inside Kosovo than when the bombing began.  The air campaign 
alone could neither halt ethnic cleansing nor avoid mounting civilian 
casualties.114 
Sensing failure, NATO leaders overhauled their grand strategy, culminating at the 
Washington Summit.  NATO’s second grand strategy placed greater emphasis on 
weakening Russia’s support to Serbia.  NATO split Russia from Serbia by highlighting 
Serbia’s depraved acts, and reminding Russia of how its long term interests lay with the 
Western powers.  NATO worked to weaken Serbia’s internal cohesion and information 
dissemination, which led to bombing Belgrade’s RTS TV station.  NATO damaged 
Serbia economically by cutting off their access to oil.   
Internally NATO focused on maintaining alliance cohesion.  NATO maintained 
cohesion through numerous meetings of the North Atlantic Council, the Washington 
Summit and by giving each government the right to refuse objectionable orders.  The 
most important moment in alliance cohesion didn’t concern NATO members but Russia.  
Russia had lost in its effort to keep NATO’s war from occurring and so Yeltsin became:  
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intent on finding a way to end the war rapidly and on making sure that 
Russia would play a key role in bringing that about... [His government] 
appeared to have realized that its interests lay not in opposing the war 
outright but in helping Milosevic get as good as deal as he possibly 
could.115 
With Russia publicly supporting NATO’s war termination conditions, “the diplomatic 
encirclement of Milosevic was complete... At the last moment, military force and 
diplomatic leverage came together.”116  Serbia faced an integrated grand strategy, and a 
united opposition. 
Finally, NATO abandoned its no invasion policy, which had hindered NATO’s 
success by letting Milosevic think Serbia could weather the storm.  Serbia received the 
message about a possible invasion from NATO leaders who dropped hints during press 
interviews, from Milosevic’s May 27th meeting with Chernomyrdin and the April arrival 
of Task Force Hawk, a U.S. aviation regiment, in Albania.  This regiment would have 
formed the nucleus of the invasion force.117 
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Figure 7.   A Depiction of the Belligerents’ Grand Strategies. 
 
C. INTER-CONNECTIONS OF THE THREE ELEMENTS 
NATO’s military-government (M-G) connection was remarkable for its command 
complexity.118  As an alliance, NATO troops collectively answered to twenty separate 
masters, the 19 member states and NATO itself.  Each unit had a NATO operational 
chain of command, and also a direct link back to its own national military headquarters.  
At times units refused NATO orders when they contradicted their national policies, a 
form of tactical flexibility that undoubtedly contributed to strategic cohesion.119  Senior 
command lines were reasonably clear.  There was one military officer in charge, General 
Clark, and he had direct control over all operating forces in the theater. 
The F.R.Y.’s M-G connection was ill defined.  Reports alternate between 
describing Milosevic’s dictatorial control over the F.R.Y., or emphasizing lawless 
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unauthorized atrocities.  The F.R.Y.’s regular forces appeared well organized with 
professional links to their government.  Serbian air defense forces maintained defensive 
fire throughout the war, and ground forces departed Kosovo in an orderly manner after 
the Military Technical Agreement was signed.  
NATO’s government-people (G-P) connection played a critical role, as NATO’s 
leaders needed to convince their populous of the war’s legitimacy, maintain support 
despite killing innocent civilians, and limit casualties.  Before the war’s start many 
debated whether NATO could legally start a war without a UN Security Council 
resolution.  NATO leaders had to develop alternate justifications and tried to sell them to 
their citizens.  During the war NATO leaders carefully cultivated internal support.  
Weapons went astray, targeteers made mistakes, and cluster bomb sub-munitions 
occasionally failed to detonate properly, littering the landscape with inconspicuous, 
frequently lethal unexploded ordnance.  These circumstances made maintaining support 
for the war difficult, especially given the myth of perfect precision weapons.   
The F.R.Y.’s G-P connection played a vital role through the conflict as Serbians 
absolutely wanted to maintain control of Kosovo Polje, the spiritual heartland of their 
nation.  This emotional factor pressured Serbia against bargaining away Kosovo under 
NATO’s threat.  Milosevic may have been an autocratic ruler, but he enjoyed an 
authentic popular mandate.  Serbians wanted to keep control of Kosovo and if Milosevic 
did not fight to keep Kosovo he could find himself deposed.  Bellicose rhetoric brought 
Milosevic to power and constrained him while there. 
NATO’s people-military (P-M) connection was defined by the way NATO carried 
out its bombings.  Fear of F.R.Y. air defenses led NATO to bomb at altitudes greater than 
15,000 feet, which often lessened effectiveness, and may have increase collateral 
casualties among civilians on the ground.  At the same time, this altitude restriction 
contributed greatly to NATO remarkable record of zero combat losses over the course of 
the entire war.  NATO states activated only a small number of reservists, never raised a 
draft, and were very concerned about limiting casualties.  American leaders still 
discussed the October 1993 Somalia debacle where the deaths of 18 soldiers led to policy 
failure.   
41 
As the F.R.Y.’s “armed forces were formed primarily by conscripts,” there was a 
strong P-M connection, however its effect on the war was minor.120  For many Serbs, the 
war appeared “virtual” until the May 23rd bombing of the electrical grids.  General Clark 
described the F.R.Y.’s experience prior to NATO bombing the electrical grids and major 
bridges as the “only air campaign in history in which lovers strolled down river banks in 
the gathering twilight and ate out at outdoor cafes and watched the fireworks.”121   As the 
war progressed Milosevic “had trouble raising extra troops... [and] Reports surfaced of 
Serb men protesting their calls to military duty in Kosovo and of a number of actual 
desertions by forces in the field.”122  While notable that the P-M connection was breaking 
down, such incidents played no significant role in the F.R.Y.’s execution of its grand 
strategy. 
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D. ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT’S LEVEL OF IMPORTANCE AND 
PASSION 
Both belligerents in the 1999 Kosovo War considered the war important, at 
different levels and for different reasons.  At first NATO leaders considered the war 
significantly important for three reasons.  First, they found ethnic cleansing in Europe 
abhorrent, and second they feared destabilization within the region.  Third, once NATO 
threatened Milosevic and he did not back down, they feared compromising the alliance’s 
future credibility.  NATO’s citizenry considered the Kosovo crises only moderately 
important, leading to leaders like President Clinton publicly ruling out ground forces to 
avoid antagonizing the citizenry. As the war continued, NATO found its credibility 
eroding.  The fear of what losing would do to NATO led  
Henry Kissinger, long an opponent of Albrights’ moralizing 
interventionism, [to] publicly [declare], once the bombing began, that 
NATO could not be allowed to fail.  If it did, the entire strategic 
architecture, linking American and European interests since World War II, 
would be in ruins.123 
After the Washington Summit, NATO considered the war of major importance because 
its credibility was in jeopardy.  Leaders prepared for the previously dismissed ground 
invasion.  What was supposed to be NATO’s short “Cabinet War” escalated, so that by 
war’s end its importance was higher than when it began.124 
The F.R.Y. considered the war vitally important.  Serbian ethnic nationalism, and 
the supposed humiliations that Serbs had suffered at the hands of Albanians, Bosnians, 
and other Yugoslav minorities, had been the centerpiece of the campaign that won 
Milosevic his office as president.  The importance of Kosovo Polje had been a dominant 
theme in Milosevic’s nationalism and he could not easily abandon it under NATO’s 
threats.  Losing control of Kosovo could also mean that tens of thousands of Serbians 
would be expelled from their homes by revenge minded Kosovo Albanians.  Only after 
the Washington summit when NATO leaders displayed strong alliance solidarity, the 
bombing escalated, an invasion was possible, and Russia shifted support to NATO, did 
the F.R.Y. reevaluate its grand strategy.  Milosevic and F.R.Y. leaders likely came to the 
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conclusion that the war would continue into the foreseeable future with commensurate 
damage, that the terms of surrender would not improve and there would not be a shift in 
the international system that would favorably end the war. If NATO invaded, F.R.Y. 
leaders would lose everything and Serbia would be occupied.  F.R.Y. leaders balanced 
the vital, if largely symbolic, importance of maintaining Kosovo against the critical 
importance of maintaining Serbia (if without Kosovo) and chose the latter.  As important 
as Kosovo was, F.R.Y. leaders were determined to maintain control of Serbia proper. 
NATO’s passions were not inflamed.  The populous recoiled against nightly TV 
images of F.R.Y. atrocities but did not clamor for war. No one rushed off to join the 
military and fight the F.R.Y.  Leaders decided to fight the F.R.Y. and then cajoled their 
citizens to support the bombing.  In America, President Clinton actively demobilized the 
citizenry when he dismissed ground forces and sought a grand strategy with the absolute 
least possible U.S. casualties.   
Serbia’s passions were inflamed to fight the Kosovo Albanians, not NATO.  
Milosevic rose to fame on a tide of ethnic nationalism, promising Serbians a greater place 
in society.  Years of ethnic violence between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs led many 
Serbs to support punishing and expelling the K.L.A. and other Kosovo Albanians from 
Serbia (including Kosovo).  NATO’s bombing shifted Serbia’s attention from 
suppressing the Kosovo Albanians to being bombed and passions cooled. 
 
E. COUNTER ARGUMENTS AND LIMITATIONS 
The analysis presented above is limited by a lack of writing on Serbia’s own 
views of NATO’s war.  Basic questions like “why did Milosevic surrender” are subject to 
scholarly debate.  Some argue that NATO’s bombing played the dominant role, others 
that it was the potential for an invasion.  Some stress Russia’s shift away from its 
traditional client.  A conclusive answer must await the recovery of the necessary 
documentary evidence.  
Particularly for the war’s second half, a counter argument could be developed that 
NATO in fact focused on destroying F.R.Y. fielded forces, rather than on coercing the 
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government or undermining public support for the war.  As NATO realized that 
Milosevic would not be quickly deterred, and that the pace of atrocities was accelerating,  
the number of [FRY military and special police] target groups that NATO 
struck increased by 177 percent from Day 20 to Day 29 and from 31 to 86 
army and policy targets.125 
It nevertheless seems clear that, to the extent that the acceleration of ethnic cleansing 
caused NATO to shift its focus toward the fielded military, it was largely ineffective.  
The F.R.Y. continued to operate smoothly enough in Kosovo and “NATO reported that 
the rate of atrocities seemed to have sharply increased during April 20-April 22, and that 
the number of mass graves had increased by 4 to 10 times.”126  Throughout the war, 
NATO warplanes tried to destroy F.R.Y. fielded combat forces and their logistics 
structure, and claimed significant success.  Claims of success were undercut when  
NATO announced on June 22 that it estimated the Yugoslav army and 
special police forces had departed Kosovo with about 47,000 Serb troops 
and nearly 800 tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces. This 
withdrawal proceeded smoothly over 11 days – creating growing 
uncertainties about NATO’s claims in terms of damage to POL facilities, 
lines of communication, and infrastructure.  It also created serious 
questions about the credibility of NATO reporting on damage to the 
Serbian ground forces in Kosovo.  Not only did the withdrawal confirm 
the Serbian build-up that had taken place during the war, it indicated that 
NATO might well have over estimated the numbers of Serbian weapons it 
had destroyed.127  
If NATO’s focus was on the fielded military, it was only marginally successful and 
would not explain the overall policy success.  Only a focus on the F.R.Y.’s government 
reflects the contours of action. 
 
F. FINAL THOUGHTS  
NATO’s success is a dramatic example of what can happen with an integrated 
grand strategy, a coherent alliance, and an isolated enemy, though it must be emphasized 
that none of these factors were present when the war began.  Initially, NATO 
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concentrated its effort on bombing Serbian leadership with some attacks on fielded 
forces.  NATO leaders expected the war to be brief as Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright emphasized the day the bombings began: “I don’t see this as a long-term 
operation.  I think this is something... that is achievable within a relatively short period of 
time.”128  Diplomatic efforts focused on maintaining NATO’s cohesion.  No integrated 
plan linked the instruments of national power. 
Fortunately NATO leaders realized their grand strategy, such as it was, was not 
working.  Atrocities accelerated.  The F.R.Y. moved additional forces into Kosovo even 
as the bombing intensified: “airpower was in fact powerless to physically prevent 
Milosevic’s atrocities against the ethnic Albanians.”129  Neighboring countries struggled 
to deal with the refugees fleeing Kosovo and NATO’s credibility was jeopardized.  
“Perversely,” as Ivo Daalder has noted “Milosevic came to NATO’s rescue.  In a way 
that alliance leaders did not anticipate, he shored up their resolve and cohesion by his 
brutal treatment of the ethnic Albanians.”130 
In the lead up to the Washington Summit, NATO leaders began to craft a more 
integrated response, and were actively working to halt Russia’s support to Milosevic.  At 
the summit leaders displayed  
a united front against Milosevic, something that probably contributed to 
his surrender as much as any NATO bomb or the incipient threat of an 
invasion.131 
NATO leaders recognized the need to maintain unity, both to eliminate Milosevic’s hope 
of fracturing the alliance, and to isolate sympathy and support for the F.R.Y.  The 
campaign to internationally isolate the F.R.Y. highlighted Serbian barbarity. Bringing it 
all together: 
after the NATO summit, the Clinton administration put in place an 
integrated strategic campaign plan that combined military, economic, 
diplomatic, and other means to achieve core US objectives.132 
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This new plan was much more successful.  The air war intensified, and appeared as if it 
could last indefinitely.  NATO leaders prepared for a ground invasion, and Milosevic 
knew it.  Finally Serbia lost its strongest benefactor, Russia.  Michael Ignatieff writes: 
Diplomacy, in other words, was just as important in changing Milosevic’s 
mind as the air war.  He gambled that Russia would support him, and that 
their support would cause the NATO alliance to fracture.  In the event, it 
didn’t.  For all their talk of a Slavic brotherhood, the Russians decided that 
their ultimate national interest lay with America, not with a Balkan 
dictator.133 
Interestingly NATO did not maintain a monopoly on offensive grand strategy.  Serbia’s 
primary effort was to disable NATO with the information instrument by highlighting 
NATO’s barbarity.  At the time, NATO’s leaders did not appreciate  
that Milosevic could afford to lose military assets because he was not 
fighting with conventional military means.  Instead of fighting NATO in 
the air, he fought NATO on the air-waves.  By allowing CNN and the 
BBC to continue broadcasting from inside Serbia, he hoped to destabilize 
and unsettle Western opinion with nightly stories of civilians carbonized 
in bombed trains and media workers incinerated by strikes on television 
stations.  Propaganda has been central to war since the dawn of 
democracy, but it took an authoritarian populist from the Balkans to 
understand the awesome potential for influencing the opinion-base of an 
enemy by manipulating modern real-time news to his own advantage.   
He gambled his regime on the tenderness of Western hearts, on the 
assumption that the Western public would not allow an air campaign to 
become murderous.134 
Milosevic crafted his own asymmetric grand strategy to counter NATO’s airpower and 
alliance.  Two grand strategies competed, on the battlefield, on the air waves, and in the 
hearts and minds of people.  
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IV. FOCUSING ON THE PEOPLE: THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION 
The grand strategy of the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) during the 
1954-62 Algerian Revolution is an excellent example of one which focused almost 
exclusively on the people.  Algerian nationalists recognized that they could not militarily 
defeat and expel the French from Algeria.  They also recognized that they did not need to. 
The FLN sought to raise France’s cost of maintaining Algeria and undercut the French 
counter-insurgency’s legitimacy in the eyes of the world, and particularly the U.S.  When 
the effort to maintain French control of Algeria exceeded the perceived value to France, 
the FLN believed France would simply leave.135   
This chapter begins with a discussion of the contours of action.  With a brief 
outline of the conflict established, four aspects of the war will be more deeply analyzed.  
They are: an analysis of the FLN’s grand strategy, the inter-connections between the 
three elements of each belligerent's organic system, the degree to which the passions 
were inflamed and the conflict’s importance as seen from each belligerent’s point of 
view.  A counter argument to test this chapter’s thesis that the FLN’s grand strategy 
focused almost entirely on France’s people will be developed.   
Four major external factors play important roles in the development of the 
Algerian Revolution.  They are: the Cold War, the French war in Indochina, the era of 
worldwide decolonization (especially France’s departure from Tunisia and Morocco) and 
the one hundred and fourteen years of French control over Algeria.  These four factors 
helped shape how the Algerian revolution affected international opinion, and the 
conflict’s importance. 
 
A. CONTOURS OF ACTION 
The Algerian revolution can be seen as a story of a colonized people attempting to 
liberate themselves from their colonial power, France, using a grand strategy that focused 
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on the French people’s will.136  While bombings and unrest by disaffected Algerians pre-
existed, the campaign for liberation began November 1, 1954 with a wave of coordinated 
“attacks on French military and police, public buildings, settler property and Muslims 
associated with the French administration.”137  The campaign for liberation stretched over 
eight years through five phases: initial Algerian successes; the French response and Battle 
of Algiers; the return of de Gaulle, the Challe Offensive and French military success; de 
Gaulle’s call for an Algerian “recourse to self-determination,” a defiant terrorist 
campaign by the pied noir (European settlers in Algeria) and final liberation. 138  
Algeria’s relationship with France began in the early 1800s.  At the time there 
were a series of independent Muslim deys that conducted piracy against European 
shipping.  France (among others) retaliated, crushing Algeria’s dey and occupying coastal 
cities and villages.  French colonization began in the 1840s.  By 1848 Algeria was 
constitutionally incorporated into France and managed by the Ministry of the Interior (as 
opposed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which handled official colonies).139  By 1954 
there were one million Europeans and nine million Arabs and Berbers in Algeria.  The 
Europeans owned the most profitable lands and businesses, and economic wealth was not 
divided proportionally between Europeans and non-Europeans.  Despite several overtures 
to improve the lot of the non-European’s lives, by 1954 little substantively had been done 
and the local Algerians were fed up. 
The French war in Indochina reached its culminating point in 1954.  France’s 
defeat at Dien Bien Phu emboldened Algerian nationalists who thought it was the right 
time to step up their campaign for independence.   FLN leaders planned a coordinated 
assault on the gendarmerie, army barracks and other symbols of French control and 
government.  On November 1, 1954 they struck.  Operating out of the Aures Mountains 
(an area in which French control was limited), FLN rebels fought with weapons that had                                                  
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been “picked up in the wake of the German, Italian and Allied armies of the Second 
World War.”140  The FLN executed seventy attacks that day, creating a sense of 
lawlessness throughout Algeria.  As published, the goal of the FLN was to achieve: 
National independence, through 
 (1) the restoration of the Algerian state, sovereign, democratic and social, 
within the framework of the principles of Islam. 
 (2) the preservation of all fundamental freedoms, without distinction of 
race or religion.141 
This was to be done through the “‘internationalization of the Algerian problem’ and 
according it the same emphasis as the struggle’s internal, military dimension.”142  Right 
from the beginning FLN leaders were conducting a campaign both within Algeria and in 
the international community.  
The French response was firm but largely ineffective.  Algerian leadership of the 
Mouvement pour le Triomphe de Libértes Démocratiques (M.T.L.D.) who had no role in 
the November 1 attacks were arrested in Algeria and France.143  Gendarmerie forces 
attempted to round up FLN leadership and forces, yet heavy handed operations only 
served to further antagonize the Muslim population.  Despite French actions, FLN forces 
were increasingly able to mount attacks on railway lines, ambushes and the Beni Oui-
Oius (Muslim sympathizers).144  The FLN created a campaign of brutalities in order to 
radicalize the Muslim population and demonstrate French inability to effectively govern.  
One of the most gruesome examples of FLN brutality was the massacre at Phillipeville in 
August 1955, “where 123 Europeans and Muslims were systematically murdered, the 
Muslims by having their throats cut in the manner traditionally used to butcher sheep.”145 
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France responded with a massive infusion of military forces (eventually over 
500,000 soldiers) and the creation of the quadrillage system which sought to limit 
support for the FLN by increasing French presence throughout the countryside.  French 
forces were fairly successful in curtailing the FLN’s freedom of action in rural areas.  In 
response, the FLN shifted to an urban bombing campaign in Algiers.  Prior to the 
bombing campaign in Algiers, even successful attacks (in the isolated countryside) were 
not reported worldwide.  To win, the FLN believed they needed to increase the 
international visibility of the conflict and the Algiers’ bombings proved very capable of 
doing just that. 
In March 1956 France granted independence to Morocco and Tunisia, greatly 
impacting the Algerian conflict.  By freeing two countries that many non-Frenchmen saw 
as very similar to Algeria, France unintentionally reinforced the legitimacy of the FLN’s 
call for independence.  The conflict escalated dramatically with the daylight murder of 
the mayor of Algiers, December 27, 1956.146  France found this act completely 
unacceptable, and deployed elite Army paratroopers to reestablish order in Algiers by any 
means necessary.  Torture became commonplace as French General Jaques Massu’s 
paratroopers seized control. 
On-scene military commanders saw such measures as necessary to achieve the 
pacification of Algiers, and did so without visible anguish or remorse.  The Battle of 
Algiers was in full swing.  In its course French conscripts were exposed to, or forced to 
participate in, torture to gain tactical intelligence.  Over time these conscripts sent back to 
metropolitan France graphic details on the war that was being waged in their name.  
These methods, while militarily successful (by the time the Battle of Algiers was 
finished, the FLN within Algiers was totally smashed) led to and policy failure.  The 
level of ill will amongst France’s people, the U.S., and international community was 
incalculable.  The brutality of the counter-insurgency campaign, while not exceeding the 
brutality of the insurgency, was so traumatic because French people and the world 
expected more from France than beating, near drowning and electrically shocking  
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massive numbers of detainees.  International worldwide condemnation, particularly in the 
UN led to the U.S. limiting its support to France at a time when financial, material and 
political support were most needed.   
Internal pressures within France were tremendous. Torture and international 
condemnation, particularly in the UN led to the fall of the President Felix Gaillard’s 
government and the fall of France’s Fourth Republic. Charles de Gaulle was returned to 
power and authorized to rule by decree for six months in order to create a viable Fifth 
Republic and get a handle on the Algerian problem.  While de Gaulle desired to have 
Algeria remain within the French sphere of influence, he was willing to let it go rather 
than risk the destruction of the newly formed Fifth Republic. 
In 1959, with Algiers pacified, President de Gaulle appointed General Maurice 
Challe as the Commander in Chief of French forces in Algeria and ordered a coordinated 
west to east sweep through Algeria, dubbed the Challe Offensive, in an effort to eliminate 
the FLN and reestablish control over the countryside.  Algeria’s geography was well 
suited to the application of French airpower, notably helicopters and bombers, and both 
were used with devastating effectiveness.  The offensive was spectacularly successful in 
military terms.  Much of the country was pacified and the FLN was driven back to their 
original stronghold, the Aures Mountains.  By now de Gaulle’s government wanted to 
secure a paix des braves (peace of the brave), and allow France to retire from Algeria 
with honor.  This ran counter to the understanding of local military commanders, who 
thought the Challe offensive intended to secure Algeria for France. 
Even with the successes of the Challe offensive, the die had been cast.  De Gaulle 
had already decided to grant self determination to Algeria.  This greatly angered the pied 
noirs, and Army forces who had suffered so greatly fighting the FLN.  General Massu, 
the hero of the Battle of Algiers, was relieved of his command for stating that military 
forces in Algeria would not accept orders to abandon Algeria.  This crisis in civil-military 
relations intensified, culminating in April 1961 with General Challe’s failed military 
coup.  Notably, the conspirators were arrested by their own soldiers.   
In a desperate maneuver, pied noir leaders formed their own terrorist 
organization, the OAS (Organization Armée Secrète).  The OAS sought to increase 
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lawlessness within Algeria, in order to force France to remain and maintain order.  Their 
campaign, while tremendously violent, failed to change de Gaulle’s decision.  The war 
continued for another year before French and FLN delegations met to discuss how to 
formalize France’s departure.  The Evian agreement, which ended the war, was signed 
March 18, 1961 and Algeria was free.147  As part of the agreement, French forces 
departed over a twelve month period.  While the OAS kept fighting, hoping to reverse 
France’s departure, French forces captured the OAS’ leaders and effectively suppressed 
the movement.  French control over Algeria ended “on July 4, 1962 [when] the French 
Tricolour was lowered in Algeria for the first time in 132 years as High Commissioner 
Fouchet, the last of Frances’s all-powerful pro-counsels, left for home.”148 
 
B. ANALYSIS OF GRAND STRATEGY 
The primary target of the FLN’s grand strategy was the will of the French people.  
The FLN believed that if French society’s support for the counter-insurgency eroded, the 
people would pressure their government to withdraw from Algeria.  The FLN recognized 
the French government, on its own, would pay almost any price to maintain Algeria 
within France.  The key for the FLN was to develop levers that could effect the 
government’s decisions.  The French people became that lever. 
In 1954, FLN leadership believed that “Algeria was a tinderbox of Muslim anger, 
[and] a few explosives would detonate an insurrectional levée [call to arms].”149  The 
FLN began their war November 1, with a series of spectacular terrorist attacks and a 
declaration of independence from French colonial rule, believing it would be the match to 
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swiftly kick the French oppressors out of Algeria.  They were wrong.  While many 
Algerians were unhappy with French rule, most wanted to improve the situation while 
staying within the French system.  
The declaration of independence captured the imagination of some members of 
French society, the U.S. and the Third World, however.  The FLN sought to establish 
legitimacy for its resistance to French colonialism using the diplomatic and informational 
instruments of power.  As part of this effort, the FLN established a government in exile in 
Tunisia with a corresponding army, the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN).  The 
exiled government and ALN dramatically improved the perceived legitimacy of the FLN 
and undercut France’s position that the FLN was a marginal group without a sizable base 
of support.  Diplomatically the FLN tried to frame its struggle in terms with the UN 
charter, which established self determination as a universal right.   Framing their struggle 
as one of national liberation, in line with the UN charter, resonated with many around the 
world, including: Western intellectuals, Third World Nations and the Non-aligned 
Movement.  By rendering Algeria ungovernable, and given that by 1954 the FLN would 
accept nothing less than French withdrawal, France fought fire with fire.  France’s 
reaction further validated many peoples’ beliefs about colonial oppression and brutality. 
Unable to affect the French government directly and ill equipped to fight the 
French Army in Algeria, the FLN fought against Muslim sympathizers.150 Symbolically, 
killing moderate Muslim supporters demonstrated the lack of French authority in Algeria.  
Practically, it deprived France the support it needed to conduct an effective counter-
insurgency.  Within the first two and a half years of the war “an estimated 6,353 Muslims 
were assassinated by the FLN, compared to only 1,035 Europeans.”151  Killing fellow 
Muslims was much easier than attacking French military forces, and proved more 
effective.  
Attempts by the FLN to project its fighting power beyond Algeria were largely 
unsuccessful.  A bombing campaign within continental France did little more than get the  
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conspirators captured.  The FLN recognized that it could never defeat the French military 
and seize control of Algeria.  Lacking the means to settle the matter definitely, the FLN 
simply influenced France, through her people, until France withdrew. 
 
Figure 9.   A Depiction of the Belligerents’ Grand Strategies. 
 
C. INTER-CONNECTIONS OF THE THREE ELEMENTS 
The French military-government (M-G) connection was marked by the role of 
professionalism and conscription within, and the government’s control over, the military.  
Among the French, professionalism within the military was assumed to lead to greater 
discipline, including following lawful orders.  As on-scene commanders began to suspect 
that the ordered sacrifices were not intended to preserve Algeria within France, but 
simply a form of bargaining in pursuit of compromise, they began to openly challenge 
political decisions.  Acts of treason like Challe’s 1959 failed coup further eroded the 
legitimacy of the French government.  Conscription also greatly affected the government.  
Conscripts were the ones which described torturing prisoners to France’s people who in 
turn influenced the government.  Interestingly, the conscript force was better able to stop 
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General Challe’s military coup.  They were more in touch with traditional forms of 
civilian-military relations and less connected to the French military’s wartime sacrifices. 
The government-people (G-P) connection in France was greatly effected by the 
introduction of conscription.  With over half a million soldiers in Algeria (out of a 
population of 42 million), many millions of Frenchmen personally knew soldiers 
involved in the war.  Soldiers home on leave told stories of how the war was being 
conducted, and were directly exposed to French public opinion.  France’s G-P connection 
also included the connection between the Muslim sympathizers who were being brutally 
murdered by the FLN.  Arabs and Berbers were not French citizens and had a weaker 
voice in setting governmental priorities.  This likely contributed to the French 
government not fully protecting these sympathizers and instead focusing on killing and/or 
capturing FLN members.  
Among the Algerians, the G-P connection was marked by the two main groups 
which comprised the FLN’s people: active and passive supporters.  Active supporters hid 
fighters and leaders in safe houses, and provided them food and clothing.  Passive, 
though involved, supporters were just as important and much more numerous.  They 
supplied the active supporters with tactical intelligence on French activities and 
provisions destined for FLN fighters and leaders.  France’s inability to sever the FLN’s 
G-P connection marks one of their key failures in their counter-insurgency effort. 
The French people-military (P-M) connection had a critical affect on the Algerian 
Revolution.  In France the call to conscription significantly strengthened the P-M 
connection, leading to a higher degree of what Gil Merom termed “instrumental 
dependence.”  Merom described “instrumental dependence” as the degree to which the 
state relies on society to “provide the resources, mostly manpower, needed to execute 
national security policies.”152  With half a million Frenchmen in Algeria, most not of their 
own free will, the people of France were very interested in how the war was carried out.  
The rejection of, and disgust for, the practice of torture, written about by leading 
intellectuals had a particularly poisonous effect on the moral of forces fighting in Algeria.  
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Many of the French soldiers had radios, and received uncensored news and opinion, 
exposing them to French and world criticism.   
The Algerian M-P connection played a major role in the war’s conduct.  Much of 
the FLN’s violence was directed at moderate Muslims, and sought to destroy the 
moderates’ presence and radicalizing the populous.  As a small insurgent/terrorist group, 
the FLN had to be very careful to maintain the existence of and support from their own 
people.  Direct support was especially strong in the Aures Mountains (militarily and 
economically), Algiers (militarily and economically) and in Tunisia (diplomatically and 
informationally).  Indirect support was strong in the Arab world (particularly in the 
governments of Tunisia and Egypt), the Soviet Union and the Third World.  Direct 
support from Algerian people gave the FLN needed assistance to carry out their 
campaign.  Indirect support gave the FLN legitimacy, critical for their morale, and 
weakened France’s alliances.  Insurgent and terrorist successes and the continuous 
presence of fighting forces within Algeria and Tunisia gave the FLN people confidence 
that they could win.  The ALN in Tunisia is a case in point of the positive effects of a 
military force in being.  To counter the ALN, French forces built the Morice Line, a land-
mined and electrified fence fortification, garrisoned by 80,000 soldiers.153   By defending 
against a possible ALN invasion, these 80,000 French soldiers could not assist the overall 
counter-insurgency.  Diplomatically and informationally, France was unable to counter 
the ALN as well.  While French forces did keep the ALN out of Algeria, they could not 
keep international journalists from going to Tunisia where they saw the ‘brave liberation 
forces’ that were defending Algeria’s right to independence and national self 
determination.  The ALN was an international public relations disaster for France. 
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Figure 10.   A Summary of the Inter-Element Connections. 
 
D. ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT’S LEVEL OF IMPORTANCE AND 
PASSION 
In 1954, French emotions about Algeria were inflamed.  Forceful rhetoric held 
that maintaining Algeria was of the highest importance to France.  This mindset and the 
long ties to Algeria led the government, military and people to resist Algerian calls for 
independence.  France was still recovering from the stinging 1940 defeat by Germany 
and recent setbacks in Indochina.  Although proved to be a delusional exaggeration, at the 
time maintaining Algeria was seen as absolutely vital to the existence of France.   
France saw their security “as no longer depending on the Rhine or the Elbe, but 
rather running along an axis from the Mediterranean through Algiers to Brazzaville in the 
French Congo.154  France argued to NATO that “Algeria represented, with England, one 
of the ‘two essential platforms upon which the military readiness rests,’” against a 
possible Soviet invasion of Europe.155  A common perception held at the time was that if 
France was to be a Great Power again she had to have possessions and colonies and 
Algeria was the keystone.  Not only did France argue that Algeria was necessary to 
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defend against a Soviet invasion across Europe, but later France to describe its counter-
insurgency campaign as anti-communist, that “if France abandoned Algeria the result 
would be communist domination of all of North Africa.”156  By describing the Algerian 
counter-insurgency with such extreme rhetoric it is no surprise that French leaders and 
the people’s passions were inflamed.  Frenchmen saw Algeria as France, maintained by 
the Interior Ministry with a population of one million European pied noirs.  Algeria had 
been a part of France as long as Texas had been a part of America.  A statement by 
General Valluy, the French representative to NATO’s standing group, shows just how far 
the passions were inflamed: “for France to stay in North Africa was a matter of ‘life and 
death’ for the French people.”157  Almost all of France it seems was caught in the grip of 
“colonial consensuses according to which the loss of empire meant French decline and 
eventual decadence, a consensus that was shared in mitigated form even by the 
Communist Party.”158 
The passions of Algerians were split.  The FLN’s rhetoric was just as passionate 
as the early French rhetoric; however they were a near microscopic minority.  The FLN 
was not a mass revolutionary movement in Maoist terms, but rather an “underground 
organization.”159  The bulk of Muslims wanted some measure of improvement but did not 
see independence as the only solution to what they saw as an unjust French colonization.  
Some Muslims favored the French government.  Faced with a general apathy, the FLN 
assassinated moderate Muslim leaders and publicized French brutalities.  In doing so they 
sought to radicalize the Muslim population and increase the support for their cause. 
As viewed through the lens of importance, the war was of vital importance to the 
FLN (who would all face long jail sentences, or execution, if the revolution failed), and 
not very vital to France (regardless of the rhetoric).  The French were fighting for pride 
(because they had been humbled in 1940 and the loss of Indochina), and because some 
had convinced themselves that Algeria was critical to their survival as a Great Power.  
This is a completely different perspective than the FLN faced.  Once the FLN declared 
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Algeria’s independence, there was no way for them to stay in Algeria unless the French 
were ejected.  Critical to understanding the question of importance is to examine the 
myth of Algeria as a part of France.  
French colonization of Algeria began in the 1830s, however in 1848 a decree was 
passed that declared Algeria to be an integral part of France, no different from other 
regions in France.  Algeria was administered as three departments: Constantine, Algiers 
and Oran, just as the rest of France was administered as departments.  Over the years 
European colonists flowed into Algeria.  By 1954 there were one million European 
settlers and nine million Berbers and Arabs.  There were numerous social differences that 
separated Algeria from ‘real’ continental France, however.  One of the most egregious 
was that ethnic non-Europeans were classed as French nationals, as opposed to the ethnic 
Europeans who were French citizens.  Citizens could vote in national elections and travel 
freely throughout France.  French nationals could not.  
 Algeria was in effect a colony, albeit one with an exceptional emotional 
attachment.  Despite the rhetoric, continental France could (and did) survive without 
Algeria.  Seen in such clear terms, it is not surprising that the FLN placed a higher value 
on the conflict’s outcome and that France would leave when the cost became too great. 
 
E. COUNTER ARGUMENTS AND LIMITATIONS 
Another way to look at the FLN’s grand strategy is to focus on the French 
government.  It could be argued that a two step process where the FLN affects the French 
people and the people influence the government only confuses already difficult analysis.  
There is a point here.  Getting the French people to oppose the Algerian Revolution was 
only successful because they helped change the government’s policy.  In reply to this 
criticism, if the model used does not place a strong emphasis on the role of the people, 
leaders may minimize the role of the people in victory or defeat and instead focus on the 





F. FINAL THOUGHTS  
The French government and people were determined to put down the Algerian 
rebellion and regain their honor lost after the 1940 defeat to Germany and the withdrawal 
from Indochina.  France should have heeded the warnings of the Indochinese experience 
however.  In Indochina, Frenchmen were sent to kill and die to maintain a colonial 
legacy.  Professional soldiers will likely perform such missions, conscripts may not.  In 
Algeria, as the number of dead rose, public support waned.  Through eight years of 
fighting, it is estimated that between 25,000 to 30,000 French soldiers and officers were 
killed in Algeria (more than twice the number of deaths per capita as the U.S. lost in eight 
years in Vietnam).160   
In fighting the FLN, France levied a draft and eventually there were half a million 
Frenchmen in Algeria.  Conscription strengthened and broadened the people-military 
connection.  Because much of France personally knew the people fighting in Algeria, the 
people felt personally connected to the conflict and thus more likely to express dissent 
(and more confident when they did).  To turn a popular phrase on its head: with taxation 
comes representation.  Frenchmen were taxed for bodies (as conscripts) and money (as 
taxes).  After being taxed for the war, the French people felt justified to lobby the 
government about how the war was being fought and when to end it.  As body bags and 
tales of torture came home, the idea of keeping Algeria part of constitutional France wore 
thin.  Many in the French government still wanted to maintain Algeria as a French 
possession, but the rose colored glasses turned clear.  Frenchmen were angered about the 
loss of French life and the use of torture as part of the counter-insurgency.  As some of 
the French dissenters had been tortured by Germans during WWII, their voices had a 
strong moral authority, and deeply affected popular opinion.   
Eventually the Algerian revolution was seen as a conflict between people who 
wanted to be free of their colonial overlords and those who wanted to maintain a status 
quo of oppression.  This narrative dramatically undercut French counter-insurgency 
efforts, both in Algeria and in metropolitan France.  France was also hindered by a lack 
of international support, notably by the United States.  The lack of international support 
was a product of, and cause for, dissent within France.  With a society repelled by the use                                                  
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of torture, and unwilling to deploy more soldiers to Algeria, France could not resolve the 
internal contradictions of her situation.  France could not suppress the Algerian 
Revolution with military force and the time had long past when non-military means could 
have offered a solution.  Internationally isolated, France’s actions were seen as 
illegitimate colonial oppression to maintain an oppressed territory.  Rather than continue 
the war and further damage the Fifth Republic, and realizing that neither military force 
nor the other instruments of national power could bring peace, France began negotiations 
with the FLN in 1961. 
In the Algerian Revolution, it appears that French leaders did not appreciate the 
ability of France’s people to turn against the war until it was too late.  If they had, 
perhaps France would have worked harder to maintain national morale.  As it turned out, 
France’s own actions exacerbated the problem.  France was unprepared to recognize or 
resist the FLN’s grand strategy that focused on France’s people.  Instead France focused 
on killing FLN insurgents, notably in the battle of Algiers and the Challe offensive.  
Torture in the Battle of Algiers while militarily successful was a grand-strategic failure of 
the highest magnitude, and directly led to many French people turning against the war. 
Comparing war to cards, if the only near term action that can be taken leads to 
long term defeat, better to not fight and fold the hand.  A losing hand should definitely 
not be played if able to play another hand, with the potential for better cards.  If a better 
hand is not possible, better to consider leaving the table.  There are few times one has to 



























The cartographic expedition is complete; three wars have been surveyed and 
results analyzed.  What has been gained?  Hopefully some aspects of grand strategy’s 
terra incognita have been charted, with its depths sounded, shoal waters and ocean 
currents identified.161  We started this expedition with a short yet robust definition of 
grand strategy: “the [coordination] and [direction of] all the resources of a nation, or band 
of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war - the goal defined by 
fundamental policy.” 162  From that definition a symmetric, non-deterministic model was 
developed by inductively linking the ‘people, government, military’ description of a 
belligerent with the instruments of national power, along with importance, passions and 
the international system.   
Applying the Instrument-Element Model to three disparate wars helped identify 
the ways belligerents affect each other.  Importantly, the case studies establish that 
focusing on any element of an adversary’s organic system can lead to victory.  The case 
studies accounted for a wide variety of grand strategies, as well as varied types of wars.  
A war for national liberation, a conventional interstate war fought over territory, and a 
police action conducted by an overwhelming alliance against a single, small nation, by no 
means exhaust the variability of war.  Yet the cases are sufficiently diverse to suggest the 
Instrument-Element Model has broad utility to assist leaders as they face crises and war. 
 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis confirms that successful grand strategies can focus on the people, the 
government or the military.  Belligerents should specifically defend each of their three 
elements from enemy attack, whether in the form of military force or the non-military 
instruments of power.  Variations in grand strategies and types of war did not prohibit 
parsing the belligerents into constituent elements and considering which instruments of 
national power were used on each element.  When necessary, modifications to help 
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analysis can easily be made, such as adding the subset “Muslim Sympathizers” to 
France’s people when looking at the Algerian Revolution.  The symmetry and non-
determinism of the Instrument-Element Model should help leaders craft a grand strategy 
with offensive and defensive components.    
Accounting for variations in importance proved one of the model’s strongest 
points.  Defining seven levels of importance, without tying them to specific issues, is a 
vast improvement over imprecise gradations like: “vital,” “important” and 
“humanitarian” which have been used to define U.S. national interests.163  Interestingly, it 
was noted that belligerents may change how they see a conflict’s importance.  Changes in 
importance occurred in the 1967 War (Arab states) and the 1999 Kosovo War (NATO).  
In the 1967 War, the Arab states downgraded the war’s importance in response to their 
sudden military defeat.  NATO increased the importance it placed on the Kosovo War 
when the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.) did not quickly capitulate and defied 
NATO’s demands.   
This thesis also found that not all elements within a single belligerent will 
necessarily agree on a war’s importance.  In the second half of the Algerian Revolution, 
the French people, and the military leadership doing the fighting in Algeria, held 
dramatically different opinions on the war’s importance.  This difference contributed to a 
crisis in civil-military relations that could have brought down the government.  Leaders 
should strive to get and keep their people, government and military in agreeing on a 
conflict’s importance.   
This thesis showed that opponents often differed in their estimation of a war’s 
importance.  In the 1967 War, the Arab states considered the war significantly important 
(once pre-war hysteria wore off).  Israel considered the war critically important.  The 
F.R.Y. considered the Kosovo War vitally important.  At first, NATO considered the war 
significantly important.  Importance escalated to major when NATO believed the 
F.R.Y.’s continued defiance threatened its existence and/or its future credibility to issue 
coercive threats.  The FLN considered the Algerian Revolution critically important, for 
France it was vital. 
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The cases showed that the passions, like importance, can change during war.  
Prior to the 1967 War, the Syrian, Egyptian, Jordanian and Iraqi people, government and 
military yearned for war.  They lined the streets in the thousands watching their armies 
march off to war.  Nasser said they would fight until the last man, to wipe Israel off the 
map.  After their dramatic military defeat, there was no more cheering, no more 
clamoring and no desire to keep fighting.  The passions for war evaporated.  Although 
not shown in the three cases, it is also possible that the passions could grow as well.  
Such elevations of passions would probably result from an enemy’s inhumane act, which 
could lead to righteous indignation. 
The three cases showed that, at any point in time, not all elements are equally 
vulnerable to each instrument of national power.164  An element’s vulnerability can 
change through a crisis.  Once a government has decided to go to war, it will be very 
resistant to the information instrument, particularly if not used in conjunction with more 
coercive instruments.  Diplomacy and information remain critical even late in a war, both 
to undercut the enemy’s support and to maintain one’s own internal and international 
support.  As Britain’s Ministry of Defense reports:  
Information was also important in our campaign against Milosevic.  In 
many ways getting our messages across in the broadcast and written media 
was as crucial as the military campaign.  It was vital to keep public 
opinion properly informed... We needed to cut through Milosevic’s 
propaganda and control of broadcast outlets in Kosovo and Serbia to let 
people know the truth, and to let an informed public decide what was 
right.165  
The information instrument helped maintain internal support for the war and kept the 
NATO alliance intact.  
This thesis finds that grand-strategically, words matter.  The rhetoric that policy 
makers use to inflame their people’s passions can later constrain a government’s options.  
Rhetoric intended for an internal audience gets heard by external audiences.  President 
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Clinton said to America: “I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war,” and 
the F.R.Y. received the message that the U.S. (and by extension NATO) was not serious 
about fighting for Kosovo.166   
 
B. AVENUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. Develop Additional Case Studies Involving Unconventional 
Belligerents 
The U.S. is actively fighting two counter-insurgencies (Afghanistan and Iraq) and 
a world-wide counter-terrorist campaign (Al Qaeda).  Developing case studies, using the 
Instrument-Element Model, of successful and failed terror and counter-terror campaigns, 
insurgencies and counter-insurgencies could provide much-needed insights.  As 
unconventional belligerents can be described with the three elements of the organic 
system and do fit within the Instrument-Element Model, it is expected that the same three 
fundamental grand strategies of focusing on the people, government or military do apply 
in counter-insurgency/counter-terrorist conflicts.  Future case studies could confirm or 
deny this supposition. 
2. Develop Case Studies Where Non-Military Instruments of Power Play 
a Predominant Role 
Developing case studies where the non-military instruments of national power 
play a predominant role would most likely develop new insights as to how non-military 
power can achieve policy results.  Current economic power seems to be limited to: 
favored trade status, sanctions and embargos.  It is suspected that more options exist than 
have been identified.167  Additionally the methods by which information is transformed 
into power remain unclear.   
3. Further Refine the Instrument-Element Model 
Further research could refine the Instrument-Element Model.  As the cases were 
developed, additional types of interactions between belligerents became clear.  Foremost 
of these is the attempt to attack the inter-element linkages directly.  At the strategic, 
operational and tactical levels such connections may refer to physical devices linking the 
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three elements of society.  Grand-strategically, the connections are primarily intangible.  
There is no grand-strategic switching station that belligerents can bomb to disconnect the 
people from their government.  Further study can reveal how to sever the three inter-
element connections, at the grand-strategic level, and how doing so would affect a war 
effort. 
Another interaction that belligerents do target, but was not reflected in the 
Instrument-Element Model, is how adversaries work directly to effect the international 
system (for their benefit), and to limit their adversary from doing the same.  In the 
Kosovo War, NATO sought to limit the F.R.Y.'s influence within the UN and tried to get 
the UN Security Council to authorize military force.  As the Instrument-Element Model is 
depicted now, it appears to passively receive inputs from and effect belligerents.  A 
refined model would show belligerents deliberately attempting to effect parts of the 
international system and blocking such attempts by their adversaries.   
A refined model could look at creating a separate index for will among the three 
elements.  Nations do sometimes go to war without inflamed passions.168  This point was 
excellently illustrated by Colonel Harry Summers in his analysis of the Vietnam War, On 
Strategy.  Summers writes:  
The student draft deferments, along with the decision not to ask for a 
declaration of war and not to mobilize our reserve forces, were part of a 
deliberate Presidential policy not to arouse the passions of the American 
people.  The effect of this was that we fought the Vietnam War in cold 
blood.169 
Wars are fought in cold blood, as NATO did in Kosovo.  The next generation of 
Instrument-Element Model, should index will and better reflect cold blooded wars.  How 
the passions relate to will is also worthy of study.  It is suspected that in wars of passion 
where the passions evaporate, there will be a corresponding drop in will, which happened 
among the Arabs in the 1967 War.  Future case studies could focus on wars where will 
and passions play a prominent role, and analyze the connections between them. 
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis recommends three changes to the way our Republic thinks about and 
fights wars.  The recommendations are: 
• Formally recognize the grand-strategic level of war.     
• Formally recognize national policy as a level of war. 
• Formally recognize ethical power as an instrument of national power. 
 
1.  Formally Recognize the Grand-Strategic Level of War 
The grand-strategic level of war should be formally recognized because it affects, 
and is influenced, by the recognized levels of war.  As this thesis has shown, it is not a 
separate, unchanging plan for war.  Within the U.S. military, the levels of war are 
formally defined in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, 
Doctrine for Joint Operations.  Differentiating war into specific levels intends: 
From a doctrinal perspective, [to] clarify the links between strategic 
objectives and tactical actions. Although there are no finite limits or 
boundaries between them, the three levels are strategic, operational, and 
tactical.170  [emphasis as written] 
Doctrine for Joint Operations goes on to discuss the levels of war individually.  
Unfortunately the definition for the strategic level of warfare merges aspects of military 
strategy and grand strategy.  It says:  
The strategic level is that level of war at which a nation, often as a 
member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational 
(alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance and 
develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. 
Strategy is the art and science of developing and employing armed forces 
and other instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated 
fashion to secure national or multinational objectives. [essentially B. H.  
Liddell Hart’s 1967 definition of grand strategy] 
Military strategy, derived from policy, provides a framework for 
conducting operations.171 
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As this quotation shows, within the same section, Doctrine for Joint Operations 
encompasses the traditional definition of strategy, which it terms ‘military strategy,’ 
while at the same time encompassing properly recognized grand strategy.   
Unfortunately, this doctrinal confusion is compounded.  Joint Publication 1, Joint 
Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, which is intended to be the capstone 
for all joint publications, opens with General Henry H. Shelton’s letter of introduction.172  
The General writes: “[Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States] also 
includes an expanded scope that bridges the gap among the national, strategic, and 
operational levels [emphasis added].”173  Later, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of 
the United States contradicts the general, saying the three levels of war are: “strategic, 
operational [and] tactical.”174  Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States 
does once mention grand strategy, but only to say it is synonymous with ‘national 
strategy.’  After this one mention of ‘national strategy,’ neither it nor grand strategy are 
mentioned again. 175 
With all this doctrinal confusion, what have theorists written about the levels of 
war?  In his book, Grand Strategies in War and Peace, noted historian Paul Kennedy 
proposes that there are four relevant levels: “political, strategic, operational [and] 
tactical.”176  Colonel John A. Warden III’s book, The Air Campaign: Planning for 
Combat, recognizes four levels of war: “grand strategic, strategic, operational, and 
tactical.”177  B. H.  Liddell Hart’s Strategy recognizes three levels, grand-strategic, 
strategic and tactical, writing: “As tactics is an application of strategy on a lower plane, 
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so strategy is an application on a lower plane of ‘grand strategy.’”178  Kennedy, Warden 
and Hart all agree that there is a level of war above strategy.  Formally recognizing the 
grand-strategic level of war acknowledges that although “‘military strategy’ and ‘grand 
strategy’ are interrelated, [they] are by no means synonymous... Grand strategy controls 
military strategy, which is one of its elements.”179  Grand strategy controls strategy just as 
strategy controls operations.  As the strategic level of war is distinct from the operational 
level, so too is the grand-strategic level distinct from the strategic level of war.  As the 
case studies showed, belligerents fought on the grand-strategic level of war.  They made 
attacks and defended against attacks, not solely military attacks, but integrated multi-
instrument campaigns.  By not formally recognizing the grand-strategic level of war, 
leaders likely overlook this critical linkage that connects policy goals with the integrated 
strategy for the instruments of national power. 
 
2. Formally Recognize National Policy as a Level of War 
Policy needs to be recognized as a level of war, for the same reason grand strategy 
should be recognized.  Policy goals affect, and are influenced by, the currently 
recognized levels of war.  Policy can and does change during a war’s course as the cases 
in this thesis showed.  Initially the F.R.Y.’s policy was to maintain control of Kosovo, but 
after suffering defeats at the grand-strategic and strategic levels of war, they shifted their 
policy to not being invaded and maintaining control of Serbia.    
Although transitioning from three levels of war to five may seem like added 
complexity, it actually simplifies all levels of war planning, because it recognizes what 
currently exists yet remains unacknowledged.  Lower echelon forces will be able to look 
to grand-strategic planning and see what its defined goals are.  By understanding the 
importance (and detailed planning) of non-military instruments, unit level military 
commanders will be better able to employ their forces, so as to avoid a grand-strategic or 
policy debacle.  Doctrine for Joint Operations recognizes the possibility “that in a world 
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of constant, immediate communications, any single event may cut across the three levels 
[of war].”180  Defining five levels of war helps make this point clear, and begins to 
develop the vocabulary and mental models needed to better conduct warfare grand-
strategically.   When considering updating the levels of war it is important to remember 
that it was not until 1982 and the Army’s Field Manual 100-5, Operations that U.S. 
military doctrine acknowledged the existence of the operational level of war.181  The 
levels of war are not unchanging truths, but have been updated over time to reflect a 
continually refined understanding of war.   
 
Figure 11.   The Five Levels of War. 
 
3. Formally Recognize Ethical Power as an Instrument of National 
Power 
The various dimensions of ethical power require more formal theoretical 
recognition.   Every time a belligerent acts in a manner contrary to its own internal values 
it has the potential to undercut the cohesion and will of its people, military and 
government.  It also emboldens the enemy who highlights the unethical behavior using 
the information instrument of power.  The enemy directs the information instrument at: 
the enemy’s own supporters (to rally support), the international system (to isolate the 
unethical belligerent from allies), and the unethical belligerent, (to reduce its internal 
support for the war).  President Milosevic understood the ethical instrument of power and 
used it during the Kosovo War: 
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Instead of fighting NATO in the air, he fought NATO on the air-waves.  
By allowing CNN and the BBC to continue broadcasting from inside 
Serbia, he hoped to destabilize and unsettle Western opinion with nightly 
stories of civilians carbonized in bombed trains and media workers 
incinerated by strikes on television stations. 182 
His effort failed, but not without disturbing many people who did pressure the 
governments of NATO’s member states.  Milosevic’s efforts to portray NATO’s acts as 
unethical were of course dramatically undercut by the F.R.Y.’s own brutal, unethical 
behavior.  When acting in a manner contrary to the adversary’s ethical values, on the 
other hand, a belligerent can dramatically strengthen the enemy’s will and passions. 
In 1967 B. H.  Liddell identified ethical power in his book Strategy when he 
described the integration which forms grand strategy.  He wrote:  
Fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy—which 
should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, of 
diplomatic pressure, of commercial pressure, and, not least of ethical 
pressure, to weaken the opponents will.  A good cause is a sword as well 
as armor.  Likewise, chivalry in war can be a most effective weapon in 
weakening the opponent’s will to resist, as well as augmenting moral 
strength.183  
Ethical Action Likely effect 
     Contrary to one’s own ethics Likely to undercut internal support 
 
Perceptions of hypocrisy may lead to a loss 
of allied support and/or isolation from the 
international system 
 Perceptions of hypocrisy may  bolster enemy will 
     Contrary to the enemy’s ethics Likely to bolster enemy will 
     Contrary to an ally’s ethics May lose the ally’s support  
     Contrary to generally accepted  
     international norms 
May lead to international isolation 
Table 2. Ethical Actions and Their Likely Effects. 
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Looking at ethical power requires looking from another’s viewpoint.  Actions that 
one adversary may consider ethical, may be considered unethical by another nation, 
global public opinion or the enemy.  Taking such an action may be the right choice, but if 
so, leaders should pause and consider the potentially significant consequences, and 
mitigate them as possible. 
Ethical power is distinct from legality, although there is a degree of overlap.  
Leaders should not solely rely on advice from lawyers, but seek commonsense opinions 
as well, particularly from those knowledgeable of relevant international sensitivities.  
Bombing Belgrade’s TV station during the Kosovo War may have been legal under 
international law, but many within the F.R.Y. and the international system considered it 
unethical because the harm it inflicted on civil society was perceived as disproportionate 
to the strategic benefit gained.  A significant backlash occurred.  Hopefully policy makers 
had balanced the possible gain of knocking Radio Television Serbia off the air for six 
hours against the potential informational, diplomatic and ethical backlash.  In light of the 
importance of ethical power, current efforts to increase U.S. cultural intelligence and 
understand how others may perceive our actions are of the utmost importance and should 
be lauded.   
 Ultimately, as Liddell Hart said, a good cause and chivalry in war are the essence 
of ethical power.  Ethical power should be recognized an “instrument of policy” in its 
own right, if only to emphasize its importance.  By not formally identifying ethical 
power, nations run the risk of overlooking it. 
 
D. DROPPING ANCHOR184 
As this thesis comes to a close, it is right to return to the subject of mental models.  
Absent the formal recognition and discussion of grand strategy, the grand-strategic and 
policy levels of war and ethical power as an instrument of national power, a leader’s 
mental models will likely lack the vocabulary to think and fight in an integrated way.  
When writing about the Kosovo War, Michael Ignatieff wrote that Western leaders did 
not “appreciate that Milosevic could afford to lose military assets because he was not 
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fighting with conventional military means.”185  Is that because doctrine and thought did 
not encompass grand strategy and the ethical instrument of power?  Certainly we have the 
opportunity to ensure that we are mentally prepared for future conflicts. 
With sound policy, grand strategy should be the lynchpin of success.  Integrating 
the instruments of national power, “the policies and armaments of the nation [ensures] 
that the resort to war is either rendered unnecessary or is undertaken with the maximum 
chance of victory.”186  This thesis has attempted to begin charting what B. H.  Liddell 
Hart rightly identified as terra incognita.  A model has been developed, case studies 
analyzed, conclusions drawn and recommendations made.  Hopefully the study of grand 
strategy will continue, leaders will formally recognize and use ethical power, and the 
inner workings of the grand-strategic level of war will be identified as has been largely 
done for the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. 
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